


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Foreign
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FBIS 50th Anniversary Note

To Our Consumers:

This year the Foreign Broadcast Information Service observes its 50th anniversary.

The service, first called the Foreign Broadcast Monitoring Service, was established in 1941 prior to the U.S. entry into World War II. At the time, a number of U.S. Government officials were concerned about the content of foreign radio broadcasts—a relatively new means of conveying information and propaganda across borders. On their advice, President Franklin D. Roosevelt in late February 1941 allotted money from his emergency fund to institute the recording, translating, transcribing, and analyzing of selected foreign broadcasts for the U.S. Government. During World War II the service demonstrated that monitoring was a fast, economical, and reliable way to follow overseas developments.

Today the Foreign Broadcast Information Service provides its consumers throughout the federal government, according to their diverse official interests, with information from a broad range of foreign public media. FBIS information also is available to readers outside of the government, through the National Technical Information Service. Objectivity, accuracy, and timeliness are our production watchwords.

We members of the current staff of FBIS extend our thanks to consumers for their interest in FBIS products. To past staffers we extend our thanks for helping the service reach this anniversary year. At the same time, we pledge our continued commitment to providing a useful information service.



R. W. Manners
Director
Foreign Broadcast Information Service

East Europe

JPRS-EER-91-024

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BULGARIA

Parliamentary Experts Comment on Draft Laws

Trade Law

91BA0225A Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian
14 Jan 91 p 2

[Interview with Professor Vitali Tadzher, head of the working commission that wrote the Draft Trade Law, by Mara Georgieva; place and date not given: "Draft Trade Law"]

[Text] [Georgieva] What are the reasons for the drafting and the enactment of a trade law?

[Tadzher] The drafting of a commercial law is necessary for several reasons. One of them is the radical restructuring of the economy of our country and the conversion to a market economy, in which the participants will be organized as merchants. The draft commercial law states that this is a law for people who are initiative- and enterprise-minded, people who work independently, freely, at their own risk. Another major consideration is the privatization that is to take place. In a centralized economy, there are no trade laws. Not a single one of the former socialist countries had such a law. This indicates that the trade law is related to a market economy and the independent regulation of economic activities. A third consideration, which justifies and determines the need for a trade law, is the creation of guarantees to foreign participants in the use of the type of trade methods that are universally accepted throughout the commercial world.

[Georgieva] During the first discussion of the draft trade law, sponsored by the Commission for Economic Policy of the VNS [Grand National Assembly] and the Union of Economists, involving a broad range of specialists, the most debated question was that of the scope of the draft law.

[Tadzher] This is the most difficult and the most delicate problem. It is difficult to answer, first of all because of the short time at our disposal in drafting it. This is a very delicate and very complex matter that should require more time. Bear in mind that it took some 30 years to draft the German law, and that the French law also was drafted over a number of years. Yet we are asked to draft such a law in no more than a few months. Second, the Western world has no uniform traditions concerning the scope of the trade law. The new trends in Western legislation are the passing of individual laws because of the great number of individual groups of social relations included within trade legislation. Germany is an example of this. It has separate laws governing maritime trade, banking, insurance, checks, and bills of exchange. In other words, we must not equate trade legislation with a trade law. Trade legislation is a much broader concept.

[Georgieva] The most debated aspect in the discussion of the draft trade law was that of being "for" or "against" extending the law to state and municipal firms.

[Tadzher] Yes, this is indeed one of the very controversial questions. The first variant of the draft included state and municipal firms. This was deleted in the second draft. The reason is that nowhere in Western legislation is this encompassed by a trade law, and no Western country has a universal system for state enterprises. If, indeed, the trade law is a law for those that are initiative- and enterprise-minded and those that display activeness, it should not include those that are basically being guided and whose activities are controlled. We say that these are state enterprises operating on a cost-accounting basis. However, there are many who feel that this is a feature alien to independent merchants. Another matter that hinders the fitting of state enterprises within the draft law is the participation of labor collectives in their management. To what extent and in what way can this be manifested, considering that this greatly depends on specific economic conditions?

[Georgieva] Many of the statements that were made revealed the opinion that state and municipal firms should be included within the draft trade law. Are there sufficient arguments in favor of this?

[Tadzher] Anything is possible on paper. On paper all sorts of legal stipulations can be put down. The question is whether they would be viable.

[Georgieva] What is your view?

[Tadzher] In my view, the administrative and rather conventional status of state and municipal firms would find it difficult to coexist with the status of companies. Let us consider one of the questions being raised—the fact that the property of a state firm has no real market value. This property has a rather conventional value because it was built on the basis of different prices for cement, concrete, iron, manpower, and so forth. The new companies being created or the merchants who will develop them are starting on the basis of an entirely different price of materials, buildings, type of investments, and nature of activities they will engage in. Therefore, the capital of a state firm, which we called so far the statutory fund, would be unable to transform itself tomorrow into capital and to be equal to the capital of a shareholding firm or any other limited liability company. On the other hand, the state firm will always have a manager appointed by a state authority. Meanwhile, all other merchants, being autonomous, will determine and choose their management structures themselves. Consider even the following: A supreme chamber of accounts is being organized. It will deal exclusively with financial control of state establishments and state enterprises and not of private companies because control over a private enterprise may not go beyond control over legality. We can determine whether a state establishment is allowed to purchase a set of crystal glasses or a set of ordinary glasses. As was the case in the past, state control

will determine whether state funds are being wasted. In a shareholding company or a privately owned firm, if the owner wants all floors to be covered with Persian rugs, that is his business. Therefore, there are substantial differences in the general approach taken by a state company or a private company.

[Georgieva] What does the comparison with foreign legislation, especially on this matter, reveal?

[Tadzher] As I pointed out, nowhere in Western legislation do we find an overall law covering state enterprises and an overall law covering state firms. The reason is not the small number of state enterprises. In Austria, for example, about 50 percent, or more than 40 percent, of the output comes from state enterprises. Nonetheless, they have separate statutes adopted by the state authorities, determining, with a view to specific conditions, their activities, relations with the budget, participation of blue- and white-collar workers in management, and so forth.

[Georgieva] What are the unusual and even shocking features of the draft trade law?

[Tadzher] The new features are exceptionally numerous, and it would be difficult to enumerate them. Let me point out, however, a few things that so far were alien to our legal thinking and that were being criticized when we discussed the Western economy. This applies to the privately owned stockholding company or a company with limited liability with a single owner. The entire capital belongs to that owner, but, nonetheless, we describe it as a company. What does this mean? When a citizen is engaged in commercial activities, he bears unlimited responsibility involving his entire property. If he has invested let us say 100,000 leva as capital in his enterprise, he pledges this 100,000 leva and his housing, summer home, car, television set, and so forth. In short, he pledges everything he has and, naturally, his bank deposits. In the West, in recent decades, it was deemed expedient to limit the liability of the merchant. The merchant should define the funds he will use in engaging in economic activities and with which he would be liable in securing and guaranteeing his creditors. This led to the creation of privately owned companies with limited liability. In such a company, the capital may be, let us say, 100,000 leva. I have set this 100,000 leva aside, and it is with its help that I conduct my economic activities and hold myself liable. I may obtain credit, but, should I become insolvent, no one can take my house, my summer home, my car, or all that I have in my home. From the cultural viewpoint, I would describe this as a great achievement because it provides safety for the family and the property of the family and the stability of the family. This is important, particularly when you consider that, in a Western-type family, both spouses engage in economic activities. In some cases, the family could find itself on the street.

[Georgieva] What are the most urgent laws that must be passed, without which a trade law could not exist?

[Tadzher] A trade law could not be applied and exist without laws on taxes, accounting, stock exchanges, banks, and privatization.

[Georgieva] Why, in your view, were there in the course of the discussion objections to the name of the draft trade law?

[Tadzher] This was the result of a lack of understanding of the meaning of the concept of merchant. In law, when we speak of a merchant, we mean a subject of economic activities and not an individual participating in trade, who purchases goods with a view to reselling them. A merchant is any participant in economic activities, regardless of sectorial affiliation or organizational form. This applies to builders, transportation organizations, transportation companies, and all types of industry, all types of design activities, and so forth.

State Accounting Law

*91BA0225B Sofia DELOVI SVYAT in Bulgarian
14 Jan 91 p 2*

[Interview with Zakhari Karamfilov, doctor of economic sciences, SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] Grand National Assembly deputy, and member of the Grand National Assembly Commission on Economic Policy, by Mara Atanasova; place and date not given: "Draft Law on the Chamber of Accounts"]

[Text] [Atanasova] The Chamber of Accounts Law was abrogated in 1948. What made the restoration of the Chamber of Accounts necessary?

[Karamfilov] The Chamber of Accounts is an arm of financial control. In all constitutional countries, the Chamber of Accounts has been an independent institution that has controlled budget revenue and expenditures and passed on their legality. The Law on the Chamber of Accounts was abrogated along with many other laws in 1948. Under the totalitarian regime, our state actually had no effective control authority. It had no need for such an authority because a totalitarian regime cannot withstand the existence of independent, of autonomous control, organs. Instead, a great variety of committees were set up. The latest was the Committee for State and People's Control. Actually, it served the ruling party itself. The paradox is also that part of the financial control is within the system of the Ministry of Finance. In other words, the executive authority, which was the target of control, had its own control authority subordinate to it. Actually, we could say that income and, particularly, the expenditure part of our budget have not been subjected to serious financial control. Whether this alone is the reason for the great disparity between budget income and expenditures is a different matter.

[Atanasova] What is the purpose of the draft law on the Chamber of Accounts?

[Karamfilov] The purpose of this draft law is to create the Chamber of Accounts and, with it, an entire control

system. We suggest the structure of the West European countries: a Supreme Chamber of Accounts with territorial Chambers of Account. The Chamber of Accounts itself, as an institution, is like a fiscal court, without being officially considered one. It is an authority that passes on the legality of expenditures. Its creation is a rather urgent matter because, at the present time, metaphorically speaking, Bulgaria is a village without watchdogs.

[Atanasova] What will be the range of the Chamber of Accounts?

[Karamfilov] The range of the Chamber of Accounts, figuratively speaking, will extend to wherever state money is involved.

[Atanasova] Without exception?

[Karamfilov] Without exception.

[Atanasova] What about the National Assembly?

[Karamfilov] The National Assembly budget is also subject to financial control. The range and activities of the Chamber of Accounts extend essentially to state budget institutions. Furthermore, they will extend to institutions with state participation, such as stockholding companies. The Chamber of Accounts will control areas subsidized by the state, although subsidies are target expenditures—for example, if subsidies have been granted to agriculture to purchase equipment or compensate for the disparity in agricultural prices but the funds have been spent for other purposes. The Chamber of Accounts must pass on the legitimacy and the expediency of such expenditures.

[Atanasova] During the discussion of the draft bill by the Commission on Economic Policy, it was objected that the national bank, as well, would be an object of control by the Chamber of Accounts....

[Karamfilov] This is a very sensitive matter. The national bank should also be subject to control in the areas of the emission of currency and securities. In terms of its other functions, the bank should be autonomous and independent. However, both the bank and the Ministry of Finance are unwilling to be subjected to control. Curiously enough, in the course of the drafting of the law, the office of the Minister of Finance considered the Chamber of Accounts as an organ that should be superior to it and that should control it.

[Atanasova] How will the autonomy of the Chamber of Accounts be guaranteed?

[Karamfilov] First, with the adoption of this law. Second, it is envisaged also to draft a constitutional text that would guarantee the independence of the Chamber of Accounts, which would be accountable exclusively to the National Assembly.

[Atanasova] For what length of time will the president of the Chamber of Accounts be appointed?

[Karamfilov] The suggestion is that he be elected for a 10-year term. However, there were objections to the length of the term. In the United States and Germany, the president of the Chamber of Accounts is elected for a 12-year term. In our country, we are debating and thinking that the institution of the president of the Chamber of Accounts is being enhanced excessively. I think this is a subjective view. Conversely, the president of the Chamber of Accounts should have his independence protected by law in order for him to be able to exercise his functions without worry. Furthermore, the draft law has stipulations concerning the conditions under which the president could be replaced.

[Atanasova] The draft law stipulates certain restrictions in the choice of managers of the Chamber of Accounts.

[Karamfilov] Yes, one of them is that the president of the Chamber of Accounts may not have been a member of the government for the past four years. The president must be a nonpolitical personality as must be the other personnel of the Chamber of Accounts. Other limitations are of a professional nature.

[Atanasova] The draft law also calls for finance courts....

[Karamfilov] One of the variants called for the Chamber of Accounts to have its own finance court, which would resolve financial conflicts between auditors and enterprises, among individual enterprises and between auditing authorities of the Chamber of Accounts and the individual companies. The auditors are sworn expert accountants, who sign the balance sheets and accounting reports of the firms. If the auditor does not sign, the activities of the enterprise or the shareholding company is considered illegal, and the court may close it down. The contradictions are related to the finance court. Initially, we had stipulated that such a court would be part of the Chamber of Accounts. Jurists advised us, subsequently, that it would be better for this court to be part of the judicial system. We agreed, with the proviso that the judges who will deal with financial affairs be jurists specialized in that area. Furthermore, there will be a unit known as the "Disciplinary Council of the Supreme Chamber of Accounts." It will pass on disciplinary violations committed by auditors. Basically, the auditors may be both state employees and private individuals specialized in this legal area. They, too, must take an oath, and, should they violate it, they would be penalized by the disciplinary council. Furthermore, very strict penalties are stipulated for financial violations, both of an administrative-punitive nature as well as on the basis of the Penal Code.

[Atanasova] What will come out of this law?

[Karamfilov] This law is related to our conversion to a new economic and political system. The Chamber of Accounts is one of the necessary institutions that ensures and creates prerequisites for a conversion to a liberal market economy. Without this institution, we cannot take any step whatsoever leading to a transition to a market economy because a market economy does not

mean, in the least, an uncontrolled market element. The Chamber of Accounts is one of the organs that regulate, direct, and, in a certain sense, economically penalize violations. With the restoration of the Chamber of Accounts, a real possibility is created for every Bulgarian to know how his money is being spent. Trust in a state is expressed also in the way it accounts to its people. It is precisely the Chamber of Accounts that is the authority that will guarantee the Bulgarian people that their money, their labor, and their efforts are being spent legitimately and purposefully.

Draft Law on Statistics Described

*91BA0271A Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian
23 Jan 91 p 2*

[Interview with Zakhari Karamfilov, chairman of the Economics Commission of the Grand National Assembly, by Neven Kopandanova; place and date not given: "The Draft Law on Statistics Is Cinderella's Good Fairy"]

[Text] Candidate of Economic Science Zakhari Karamfilov, chairman of the Grand National Assembly Economics Commission, on how the servant of socialism—statistics—will become the nobility of a market economy.

For two countries, companies, or enterprises to develop contacts, they must have a compatible information language. This applies mainly to accounting, statistics, and financial control. That is why these three laws—on accounting, statistics, and the Chamber of Accounts—are viewed as a packet of laws that create a technological compatibility for the integration of our country with the West European countries.

[Kopandanova] What was the basis for the creation of a draft law on statistics?

[Karamfilov] So far, our country has had three laws dealing with statistics. The first was passed in 1897, the second in 1910, and the third in 1946. The last one, however, was abrogated in 1953. Since then, statistics have been controlled with decrees and legal acts and developed as an administrative unit of the executive branch—the Council of Ministers. To begin with, we made a thorough study of the old laws, after which we studied the Canadian, the Swedish, and the Finnish, and the new Hungarian law. I cannot say, however, that our law is quite like any of them. The specific conditions prevailing in each of those countries make impossible the strict duplication of legislation, such as to be consistent with the traditions and characteristics of the country.

[Kopandanova] What motivates the reform in statistics?

[Karamfilov] So far, statistics served a single party and was its instrument. As a science, statistics is strong in terms of methodology, for which reason now, when the country's economic system is changing, it is greatly needed in the management of such processes. In that

sense, reform in statistics aims at the creation of an institution that not only would record individual events but would also study them with a view to their future development trends, or else the reform is related to a conversion from the so-called descriptive statistics to forecasting statistics, which encompass and study processes and provide the tools, ways, and means of controlling them. The processes of a market-oriented economy, for example, must be controllable because a market economy itself is not a magical means that could lead us out of the crisis. That is why the draft law suggests that, from a bureaucratic institution, statistics will become a research institution. A national statistics institute will be established.

[Kopandanova] Under the new circumstances, what status will it have?

[Karamfilov] The national statistical institute will be considered an autonomous and independent budget-supported institution. Its chairman will be elected by parliament for a five-year term. The parliament shall ratify the program of the institute, which will then perform its activities independently and autonomously.

[Kopandanova] What are the other essential aspects of the draft law?

[Karamfilov] The first is that this will be an organization operating in a competitive medium. In other words, the law will cover not only the activities of state statistics but also statistical activities in general, which could be carried out by other units on the basis of private, company, or individual rules.

The second essential principle is the very close integration between statistics and the information industry. A contemporary study, however modern is the method used, carried out with the manual processing of data cannot yield the expected results and could even discredit the study itself. The law emphasizes that this line in structuring a national information system must be developed.

The other principle is making our statistical methods compatible with European and global standards. A basic aspect here is also the creation of national statistical archives. Such archives must be developed under the auspices of the national institute. However, they must involve the participation, even if mandatory, of all other entities engaged in such activities. A country may not permit itself to waste or lose statistical studies. According to some, this may be a bureaucratic obligation. Although it may appear to be such, it is necessitated by the interests of the state.

[Kopandanova] Will some statistical information be prohibited?

[Karamfilov] Basically, statistically forbidden information does not and should not exist. However, information aimed at statistical objectives may not be used for other purposes, for or against a specific individual. That

is why the law settles the problem of confidentiality, as well. A written oath will be signed by anyone participating in the gathering of information. It is a matter of its recording and use.

[Kopandanova] Was the drafting of the law hindered by political biases?

[Karamfilov] There were no political biases. There was support for a variety of professional views. Statistics is one of the fundamental sciences that have developed regardless of sociopolitical conditions, and I am very happy that the people accepted this as professionals.

BSP Official: Party's Responsibility for Crisis

91BA0218A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 5 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Interview with BSP (Bulgarian Socialist Party) official Dimitur Ananiev by Vasil Popov; place and date not given: "The Commission on the Political Responsibility of the BSP for the Crisis in the Country Is Ready With Its Draft Declaration"]

[Text] A draft document, provisionally entitled "Declaration of the Supreme BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] Council on the Party's Political Responsibility for the Crisis in Contemporary Bulgarian Society," has been prepared. It reflects the opinions and positions of the members of the Commission of the Supreme BSP Council on the Responsibility for the Crisis and the Culprits. Before its adoption, the draft must be considered by the Presidency and the Supreme Council.

Discovery and analysis is the way Dr. Dimitur Ananiev, deputy chairman of the commission, defines its work in answering a few questions for the readers of DUMA.

[Popov] What is the nature of this draft document in which you have synthesized the studies so far made by the commission?

[Ananiev] It is similar to the documents adopted at the latest congresses of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the former PZPR [Polish United Workers Party]. It is a general political declaration and not a specific historical study or a personal evaluation. We proceed from the view that the full explanation of the reasons the country was brought to its current state of crisis is the future task of specialists and historians. You know that it is very rare for contemporaries to be able to assess their actions objectively and rightly. A certain distance and a cooling off of passions are necessary. The document that is being prepared is nothing other than an expression of the present self-awareness of the party or, rather, of its leadership, concerning the range, depth, and extent of its political responsibility for the end results of almost a half-century of party rule.

[Popov] This is a long historical time segment. You are clearly breaking it down chronologically and seeking the party's responsibility in the individual periods.

[Ananiev] No. We are using a different methodology. We try to analyze the party's responsibility on different levels and in different areas of activity. It seems to us that such an approach makes it possible to outline more clearly and in more general terms the responsibility of the party, taken as a unit combining theory, strategy, ideology, morality, practical policy, and organizational-cadre structure and to draw lessons applicable to its current activities. This will define the theoretical, doctrinal, ideological, moral, practical-political, organizational-structural, and cadre activities of the party in the eyes of society. In addition to everything else, this approach makes it possible to build a direct bridge leading to the contemporary need for a renovation of theory, ideology, politics, structure, and relations within the party and between it and other entities.

[Popov] In your view, what is the party's doctrinal responsibility?

[Ananiev] Our views on the imposition of a predetermined model of social life were not justified. Our attempts to convert man into a comprehensively developed individual, a collectivized altruist, and a means of attaining the socialist objectives were unsuccessful. Our views on the correlation between the social and the instinctive-biological nature of man were not confirmed. We now realize the immorality of the demand to sacrifice today's man for the sake of tomorrow's happy man. The expectation of jumping from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom was a grand illusion.

The open and honest admission of these and many other theoretical postulates held yesterday is a prerequisite for the restoration of confidence. Our party and the socio-political movement related to it are neither the first nor will they be the last to serve illusory objectives. What is important is to see on time and to admit one's error. In the case of a party, this means changing programs, strategies, ideologies, internal structures, and cadres. This is the eternal cycle of social progress and of the historical process.

[Popov] This indicates that the commission's draft directly links doctrinal responsibility to the party's moral responsibility.

[Ananiev] Yes. Our doctrinal burden necessarily became a moral burden. It was manifested in replacing universal with class-party morality and approach. This, in turn, was an apology of violence and a confusion of the traditional concepts of good and evil, justice and injustice, honesty and dishonesty.

[Popov] What are the other levels of the party's responsibility?

[Ananiev] According to the draft, above all they are in the area of economic policy. The party is responsible not because it sought a way to surmount Bulgaria's backwardness through the accelerated updating of the economy. If others had ruled the country after the war, they would have taken the same path. We consider as our

responsibility the fact that we tried to resolve this problem with the help of ideological prejudices, political impatience, and unbalanced international obligations. The party is responsible for the one-sided nature of foreign policy relations that separated us from the global economy and isolated us from scientific and technical progress.

The draft also outlines the party's responsibility for the condition of agriculture and of the soil, water and air, the foreign debt, and the country's dependency.

A profound and comprehensive study is being made of the party's responsibility for the pursuit of a national policy. Particular attention is being paid to clarifying the party's responsibility in imposing an ideological diktat and a bureaucratic-administrative approach in managing the spiritual life of society.

[Popov] What is the view of the commission on the party's responsibility concerning the nature of the party itself?

[Ananiev] This is another level and area of our analysis. The view of the commission is that all of the party's responsibilities could be reduced to a single one: the fact that it was a party of a bolshevik (Leninist) type—hence, the beginning and the combination of all responsibilities. The party's responsibility is that it allowed the establishment of a narrow stratum of leading cadres in its vertical structures, which actually appropriated the right to resolve all problems of the party and the state in the name of the party's members, and the fact that it allowed the demand of discipline and total unanimity to suppress the possibility of a democratic expression of the members, to suppress their initiative and energy and to concentrate tremendous power in the supreme authorities and the party's leader. The commission considers the party's responsibility also in the fact that it allowed the party elite to develop a system of privileges and to live with the feeling that it was exempt from the laws and was allowed to do anything, and that it replaced competence in the promotion of cadres with personal loyalty to the leader.

[Popov] Are these not too many responsibilities? Does the commission ignore the historical circumstances in which the party acted?

[Ananiev] The draft pays particular attention to this. We realize that, after the war, Bulgaria was a defeated country. It could not exist and develop outside the spheres of influence that had developed and the paralleling worldwide confrontation. It was influenced by a great variety of political forces and, above all, by obsolete and erroneous formulas of the Comintern and Stalinism. Under the pressure of and the direct interference of the Kominformburo, the development of the country was separated from the original political path leading to the creation of a democratic, humane, and just society. Simplistic and dogmatic concepts of world

socialism, which ignored the wealth of national and social variety, were imposed upon the party from the outside.

[Popov] Will responsibilities nonetheless be personalized?

[Ananiev] We shall draft an extensive report in which we shall try to emphasize the specific responsibilities of the party and the guilt of individuals within the party in the various areas of its work.

Party of Freedom and Progress Leader Interviewed

91BA0239A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 10 Jan 91 p 3

[Interview with Ivan Georgiev, chairman of the Party of Freedom and Progress, by Zoya Nestorova; place and date not given: "Liberals Are Optimists"]

[Text] [Nestorova] Is it not your impression that in Bulgaria modern liberalism is unknown?

[Georgiev] Such was the case until recently. In the past few months, however, great interest has been shown in liberalism both by parties, movements, and groups and by individuals. This indicates that, in the near future, liberalism will assume its place on the Bulgarian political scene. The Party of Freedom and Progress is a member of the Bulgarian Liberal Union, which also includes the Liberal Democratic Party in Bulgaria and the Free Democratic Party. Historically, we do not consider ourselves the direct descendants of any Bulgarian liberal party, although we respect their traditions.

[Nestorova] Because you are not basing yourselves on tradition, could you define the principles that guide your political activities?

[Georgiev] We are oriented toward the post-1947 liberalism. Some mass media consider it an ideology or something like it. That is why I emphasize that contemporary liberalism is based on the universal principles of tolerance, calm, order, guarantees, security, freedom, and protection of the individual. Countries in which such qualities are lacking have no liberal parties. Indicative is the example of a number of Arab states in which, despite their wealth, there is no freedom of the individual. It is no accident that such parties are governing mainly as members of coalitions precisely in Western Europe, in countries such as Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Finland. Although their membership is small, the liberal parties actively participate in economic life.

[Nestorova] As a rule, a liberal economic program is viewed as a social program....

[Georgiev] If we are for the individual, the individual must have guaranteed security. However, the liberals believe that the state should not dispense charity but should create conditions for the individual to live well by his mind, his intellect, and his resourcefulness. Here is a

basic example: In the case of some left-wing parties, if urban transportation is inexpensive—that is, if it is subsidized—that is a social policy. In our view, it is not that the cost of the tickets should be low but that the citizens should become rich. In Germany, for example, if a person decides to walk the length of a stop, he would save enough money for a beer. The individual should be given the opportunity to assess his own actions in terms of profitability, when to save and when to risk.

[Nestorova] Everyone is speaking of a market economy, but the leading countries have their own models. Are your preferences influenced by this example?

[Georgiev] Our place is in Europe. We must seek allies in the Old Continent. Our choice of a model of a market economy should be close to countries that express the wish to cooperate, such as Germany. Our party will help through its international contacts in our faster resolution of the economic crisis. In 11 European countries, liberals participate in coalition governments and are usually in charge of the ministries of economics and finance.

[Nestorova] How are you organizing your contacts with them?

[Georgiev] They are showing an interest in us. The party has sections abroad—in the Soviet Union, France, and Belgium. We are cooperating with the Liberal International, the European Federation of Liberals, and with democratic and progressive parties, as well as with individual liberal parties in Europe. We maintain useful contacts with the Free Democratic Party in Germany and the Party of Freedom and Progress in Belgium. We participated in the congress of the Liberal International, which was held in Helsinki, and in the conference on the development of a market economy and privatization in East European countries, which was held in Warsaw, and attended specialized seminars in Germany, Greece, and Portugal on various topics related to the development of contemporary liberalism.

In the course of these forums and meetings, we established personal contacts with a number of noted European politicians, such as Adolfo Soares, Otto Count Lansdorf, Willi de Klerk, Methild von Aleman, and others. In Warsaw I studied the Polish economic reform with Mr. Balcerowicz. He expressed the wish to visit our country. Great help was given in the training of our members by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation in Germany. It has already assigned a representative, Mr. Arnold Veckbecker, who will be in charge of the countries of southeastern Europe.

[Nestorova] Shall we forget the past?

[Georgiev] Yes, but it will be difficult. As is the case with economics, which is advancing toward a commodity market, in politics as well there must be a market of ideas and actions. Democracy can be born and a policy discarded only through loyal competition.

Interview With BZNS-Vrabcha 1 Official

91BA0210A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 12 Dec 90 p 4

[Interview with Yordan Duparinov, BZNS-Vrabcha 1 secretary, by Boyko Vutov; place and date not given: "For Sacred and Inviolable Private Property"]

[Text] The Vrabcha 1 Bulgarian Agrarian People's Union was reestablished on 10 December 1989 and registered on 3 May 1990. It is an extension of the party that bore the same name and that was founded in 1907. It takes its name from the village of Vrabcha, Trun Oblast, where, during the war between Bulgaria and Serbia, a Trun border detachment stopped the advance element of King Milan's forces. The party's building was located on Vrabcha Street in Sofia. Currently, this building houses the national opera and the BZNS [Bulgarian National Agrarian Union]. Dimitur Dragiev, Tsanko Tserkovski, and others were the founders of the BZNS-Vrabcha 1. The restorer of the party today is Mr. Strakhil Gichev, son of Dimitur Gichev, the agrarian leader. The organization does not have an exact list of its members or their number because it has party groups in only a few of the large cities. It has stopped the founding of new groups in order to prevent a triple division of agrarians in the country. Yordan Duparinov is secretary of the BZNS-Vrabcha 1.

[Vutov] Let us start with a more general question—about your position as a party within the Christian-Social Alliance.

[Duparinov] Our secretary, Strakhil Gichev, now deceased, was one of the founders of the union. After his death on 10 October 1990, a movement for leadership and for leading the union on the path of nationalism began in some parties within the association (which was founded on 18 September). We were able to control the processes and preserve the identity of the Christian-Social Union [KhSS]. It is in the center of the political spectrum (somewhat to the right) and rejects political extremism. We favor a real democratic opposition linked to our predecessor, the government of the People's Bloc, headed by Mr. Muraviev. We have a clear attitude concerning the national problem and categorically reject extremism.

[Vutov] What is the attitude of the KhSS toward property and, especially, toward the land?

[Duparinov] The KhSS favors the unconditional restoration of the land and the means of production to those who owned them or to their heirs. The KhSS considers the right of ownership sacred and inviolable, with the exception of property acquired by criminal means. Today, both from the right and the left, in parliament, there is talk of a market economy. However, it is not being clearly and categorically stated that capitalism will be restored in Bulgaria. Naturally, not in its old primitive aspect.

[Vutov] What specifically is the aim of the BZNS-Vrabcha?

[Duparinov] On the political level, the BZNS-Vrabcha tries to cooperate with anyone who favors real parliamentary democracy. On the economic level, we favor sacred and inviolable private ownership in accordance with the Turnovo Constitution. The land belongs to those who owned it. We are in favor of abolishing the expropriation laws of 1947 and 1948. The land may also be given to landless people who would like to cultivate it and, subsequently, may be granted the right to purchase it. We insist that the people's councils stop giving land indiscriminately to their supporters because a great deal of such land has owners, and this will subsequently lead to undesirable consequences. This question is one of the prerequisites for having civil peace in Bulgaria. In discussions I have held with some businessmen from Europe, I was bluntly told that, unless the right to private ownership of the means of production is restored in Bulgaria and is guaranteed, they will not invest in our country.

[Vutov] What is their attitude concerning the political processes and political forces in our country?

[Duparinov] The Western countries continue to have different approaches to the countries of Eastern Europe. One group includes Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Another consists of Bulgaria, Romania, and Albania. Metaphorically speaking, today these three are, as Lenin said, in a state of complete capitalist encirclement. Until the totalitarian structures have been dismantled in our country, we cannot hope for any different attitude and investments. The view of the Western businessmen with whom I spoke, one of them being James Velkov, is that marching toward Europe under BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] leadership is not a suitable method. I must point out, however, that the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], as well, does not enjoy a good reputation in the West. The West clearly realizes that the same totalitarian structures prevail within the union.

[Vutov] The question of the guilt of the BSP and its former leaders continues to be exploited intensively by the SDS....

[Duparinov] Members of the BSP, do not be afraid! We have suffered enough, and, for that reason, we shall not allow a new witch-hunt. However, the truth must be told. Errors may be forgiven, but we should no longer dodge and wait. By waiting, the BSP is only harming the party's future existence, as well, with 200,000 to 300,000 members of your generation, socialists who were born between 1945 and 1950. However, it should be a normal party even if it becomes an opposition party, enjoying the same property-owning opportunities as the other parties.

[Vutov] Where is the solution, and how can we reach it?

[Duparinov] You understand, I hope, the need for a political center. It is too early to speak in specific terms, but we are engaging in discussions with parties within the SDS that show a tendency to separate because, for the time being, the vacuum existing between the two forces in our country is dangerous. The trade unions should not be excluded from this process because they represent the working people and thus are a major force. Bulgaria needs a real and not a polarized opposition. I believe that the creation of a unified agrarian union in Bulgaria is a step in that direction.

Social Democratic Daily on Edinstvo Trade Union
91BA0246A Sofia SVOBODEN NAROD in Bulgarian
8 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Article by Plamen Kerelski and Rumen Panchev: "The Edinstvo Red Porcupine"]

[Text] The appearance and establishment of the Edinstvo New Trade Union, which is a legal organization with its own seal, bank account, seat of operation, and all other bureaucratic attributes, is already a fact. At its last congress, the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] declared its intention to set up its own trade union. At the same time, stress developed in the KNSB [Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria], and attempts to split it were made. These three facts are indivisible and illustrate relations and interdependence between politics and trade unionism. What is still unclear is the size of the membership of the new trade union and its nature. What is its social base, political orientation, and trade union ideology?

We may conjecture about it from the statements by Mr. Ivanov, member of the trade union's administrative council, broadcast on the radio: "We are in favor of a national movement for civil peace, unity, and legality." Separate from it is the Movement for Objective Television, which is very familiar to the public. As a whole, the national movement is in touch with the ERA-3 [Union of Democratic Parties and Movements—ERA-3], in whose notorious newspaper, NOVA ERA, it published its declarations.

In connection with the statements that were made, we should remember a few facts. ERA-3 is the second opposition that appeared at the time of the roundtable and that worked hard to defame the "blue" opposition. The prosecutor's office was asked to close down its newspaper, NOVA ERA, because of the malicious and groundless accusations it printed against the president of the Republic. The Movement for Objective Television, as well, has a "grand and worthy" past. These people charged that the television is "blue" and that its entire management should resign. The movement printed its attacks on the television also in the newspaper DUMA. This may be described as the prehistory and social atmosphere of the new trade union, which is also nationwide.

The very name "All-National Edinstvo Trade Union" contains the type of absurdities that constitute the foundations of the totalitarian ideology of Stalinist communism. Furthermore, they are actually reflected in our political practices in several aspects:

- **The political aspect.** In our recent past and in our present political life, only one party structured and is structuring its ideology and politics on the concept of "nation," "unity," "national interest," and others like it. The logical absurdity of these concepts leads to the implication that anyone who remains outside that party or does not share its views and ideology is not part of the nation and is against the national interest.
- **The trade union aspect.** Applied to trade unionism, these concepts and the logic stemming from them mean opposition to trade union pluralism. What is the meaning, given the existence of two large trade union confederations, of the appearance of a *national trade union*? It means that the already functioning trade unions are alien to and even against people. Edinstvo is, therefore, the trade union that will represent the people.

Who Gave the Signal for the Creation of Edinstvo?

The appearance of Edinstvo is inseparable from another fact. At the last BSP congress, the idea was launched, along with the creation of new newspapers, to consider the establishment of a socialist trade union. Socialist newspapers, in addition to DUMA, started to appear; therefore, the implementation of the trade union idea could not be neglected. And, as we can see, it is being promoted. In the case of a renovated communist and Stalinist party, this is in total contradiction to its statements and intentions, according to which the renovation of a trade union element in its policy means a return to the legal or semiclandestine past of the BCP. When the struggle against capitalism demanded the party to have a striking fist, the trade unions were the party's cover. Furthermore, the BSP proclaims its support of a market economy. What will be the place of such trade union practices dating from the time of its struggle against capitalism?

Stress and Effort Split the KNSB

The stress inside the KNSB cannot be ascribed exclusively to discontent from the behavior of the confederation's management during the national strike or exclusively to the efforts of Edinstvo and the political forces backing it to split the trade union. The reasons may be found in the nature of the KNSB and its heritage and the aspirations of its leadership. The confederation is in a process of transition from its politically opportunistic past to unification with the trade unions, which share a modern trade union ideology and way of thinking consistent with the conversion to a market economy.

The behavior of the leadership of the confederation during the national strike was clearly an effort to strike a balance between the need for trade union action against

the government and the expected opposition of some of the federations and members of the confederation. It has long been clearly understood that the KNSB is not united when decisions related to the political situation must be made and, particularly, when they appear to be aimed against the BSP government or its policy. It became obvious that the contradiction between the red membership cards of the BSP and the trade union cards of the KNSB has only one solution. If the trade union position conflicts with the straight communist way of thinking and the feeling of loyalty to the party of unity, the upper hand is assumed by the red party membership card. Supporters of the BSP within the KNSB as well as the former communist *nomenklatura*, which still remains within the structure of the federations and in the primary organizations, could not accept any efforts on the part of the confederation's leadership to assume a firm trade union position and policy toward the government and the political forces. They still adhere to the political stereotypes of the past, which could be reduced to loyalty to the party: "The trade unions are a guarantor of party policy"; and "the trade unions are a partner of the state and economic leadership."

The contradiction between politics and trade unionism within the KNSB developed into a contradiction between its leadership and the leaderships of some of its member organizations. This contradiction had existed for quite some time, caused by the pace at which the KNSB was changing. The rejection of the political stereotypes of the past and the conversion to trade unionism were sluggish. The supporters of the BSP and the former *nomenklatura* still nurtured the concept that the KNSB backs the BSP and will continue to back it with its policies. This assessment may not be to the liking of the present KNSB leadership. However, facts cannot be avoided.

First, the KNSB pursued a trade union policy of unification and opposition to Podkrea. This unification was based on the trade union "war" waged against the blue trade union. We cannot deny that this indirectly benefited the political interests of the BSP. Second, in February the KNSB inherited the federations and the organizations and, therefore, the entire sectorial structure of the Bulgarian trade unions. These structures included the remaining rear guard of the communist *nomenklatura*. Efforts at changing cadres have hardly moved beyond the confederation teams. Third, the state, the government, and the economic managers preferred to maintain contacts with the KNSB, which were more clearly defined and easier, compared to dealing with Podkrea. The employers saw in the KNSB their own former partners. The latest activities of the Executive Committee no longer coincided with their concepts and predilections for the BSP. These are precisely the grounds for which the appetite shown by Edinstvo was aimed at the KNSB federations. The reason is that *Edinstvo can see its future in the past of the KNSB*.

The KNSB has still not rejected this past, on which Edinstvo is relying. The organizers of the new trade

union benefited from the situation and the contradictory assessments of the behavior of the confederation leadership during the national strike and the dissatisfaction among its structures, stemming from their opposition to the Lukášov government. They imagined a partial coincidence between the views of Podkrepá and the KNSB, which was a horrifying thing in terms of their political biases. Trade unionism, in their assessments and behavior, yielded to political biases in favor of the BSP. Such is the social base of the attack mounted by Edinstvo.

Possibilities are being created for attacking the efforts of the KNSB leadership to structure the confederation's policy on a contemporary trade union basis. This also offers the opportunity for a secession of federations, attempted by their leaderships. The essence of the entire process has nothing in common with demands for resignation or unification with Edinstvo. It is a question of an offensive mounted by a political force against trade union independence.

The purpose of such a policy is the desire to control a trade union that it believes to have created at one point and that still belongs to it. Let us have no illusions: There are many trade union members with red cards who think similarly. The latest appeal of the BSP Supreme Council toward its sympathizers and supporters "...to work for strengthening the unity, independence, and democratization of the trade union movement" is another piece of advice to the members of that party to interfere in the activities of the trade unions, signaling them to pursue the old line of charges and accusations leveled at the KNSB for its efforts to pursue an independent trade union policy. The appeals for "unity" could be perceived also as a play on words, indicating support of the new trade union called "Edinstvo" [Unity].

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Removal of StB Members From Army Sought

*91CH0320A Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY
in Czech 29 Jan 91 p 3*

[Interview with Jan Solc, member of the presidium of the Federal Assembly and of the committee of the Chamber of Nations for armed forces and security, and Dr. Jan Duchek, chairman of the main commission for the screening of officers and warrant officers, by Jan Bauer; place and date not given: "The End for StB [State Security] Members in Armed Forces"—first paragraph is ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY introduction]

[Text] These days the screening process of members of the military counterintelligence is nearing its end. That institution is somewhat mysterious to our public; although a part of the armed forces, it was in the Interior Ministry. We discussed the progress and significance of the screening with Jan Solc, a member of the Federal Assembly's presidium who is also a member of the commission for armed forces and security of the

Chamber of Nations, and with Dr. Jan Duchek, chairman of the main commission for the screening of officers and warrant officers, who, by the way, was dismissed from the Army in 1970 for his political attitudes and last spring readmitted to active service.

[Bauer] According to the general view, military counterintelligence actually represented the StB [State Security] within our armed forces. What are the facts?

[Duchek] Military counterintelligence was the so-called third administration of the SNB [National Security Corps]. Naturally, that spurs the impression that those were actually members of the StB, and identifies them with the former second and tenth administrations of the StB. Nevertheless, its specifics were to a certain extent different because military counterintelligence operated in the environment of the armed forces and its field of operations was considerably broader. Its tasks included readiness for action, protection of arms and ammunition, safeguarding of state secrets, struggle against foreign intelligence services, etc. Internal problems, in other words, the so-called incitement to subversion pursuant to Article 100 or the fight against ideological subversion, represented only one mode of its operations.

[Solc] One of the questions I asked the screened intelligence officers who graduated from the SNB College was whether they could compare the personalities and professional level of their colleagues who were their fellow students but belonged to StB. Their replies clearly spoke in favor of the military counterintelligence which all of them characterized as of a higher class and more professional. The reason they gave was that nepotism was rampant in StB units.

[Duchek] Members of the military counterintelligence felt that they were a class above the StB because they belonged to the Army and to the officers corps.

[Bauer] One round of screening in the military counterintelligence was completed already a year ago in the spring. At that time only about 20 percent of officers were screened, which caused a considerable public uproar. What difference is there between the former screening and the rescreening now?

[Solc] I was one of the first deputies who questioned the former minister of defense, General Vacek, about the screening. I stressed that the process just passed the buck, that they not only failed to break down the CZCS structure in the Army but rather supported it, and that they did not deal with problems. During the current screenings it interested me, among other things, how individual officers who were screened regarded this rescreening and how did they compare it with the first round. I learned that during the first round of screening their superiors held posts in commissions as members or even as chairmen, which is absolutely unconscionable. And furthermore, that our commission proceeds with far better knowledge of the matter and is interested in the whole range of correlations, which makes very sincere discussions possible.

[Bauer] Do you have advance access to materials on the rescreened members of the counterintelligence?

[Solc] I can say that we are relatively well prepared for the rescreening. The central administration of military defense intelligence services furnished us with extracts from the microfiches of every member; they include the name of the screened officer, the name of the soldier whom he "processed," the pertinent article of the regulations, the content of his decision, and then the so-called conclusion. In addition, we are proceeding from a personal file which contains everything, including friendly contacts with the members of the KGB, political attitudes, etc. Naturally, we have learned that we can trust these documents only 50 percent because many data in personnel records have been exaggerated or concealed in an attempt to give friendly help to this or that officer. In addition we have lists of the so-called verbalists; those men saw to it that soldiers were punished for singing Kryl's songs, for telling jokes about Andropov, and so on. And finally, about 7,000 letters from the military public concerning our planned task were our aid and guidance.

[Bauer] What kind of people are the ones whom you call "verbalists"? Are they older or rather younger individuals?

[Solc] Older people with substandard education more often worked in the inner base; they tried to make up for their own intelligence work by informing on soldiers. A real expert would prefer to deal with such issues in individual, often quite informal interviews. We have a number of cases which show the counterintelligence officers in the best light because they realized that such procedures are futile. Moreover, interest in investigation of internal matters had been markedly declining since about 1986.

[Bauer] Were the members of the military counterintelligence very devoted to the communist system? Did they anticipate the possibility of a political change?

[Solc] The Army was really devoted to the CPCs since 94 percent of its officers were organized in the party. But it was politicized rather than political. For instance, I was greatly surprised that the graduates of the Military Political Academy could analyze the situation relatively poorly and would even incorrectly answer general political questions. On the other hand, the graduates of technical institutions demonstrated better skills and knowledge. Every intelligence officer, specifically analysts who gather and evaluate information, generally sensed already one year before November 1989 that a change was inevitable. Then that November the members of counterintelligence were forced to participate in essentially patrolling operations, which they themselves considered embarrassing. However, there was not a shred of evidence that this particular unit played there the role of which we earlier used to suspect it. Confusion and chaos reigned even there.

[Bauer] How large is the part of the officers who will not pass the rescreening?

[Solc] The military counterintelligence had originally about 1,200 members. Some of them returned to civilian life upon their own request or because they were compelled, and roughly 700 members remained. They are now undergoing the rescreening, after which about 70 men should remain to lay the groundwork for our new military defense intelligence.

[Duchek] It is expected that after the groundwork is laid, the army intelligence unit will consist of only about 200 persons, but there it will face problems such as the former counterintelligence never had to tackle. Offhand I can mention the problems of refugees and of international terrorism, and the activities of foreign intelligence services that did not operate in our country before.

[Solc] It is a moot question whether our military defense intelligence will be able to operate at all with so few members. To be sure, it is no secret that foreign intelligence services are rushing into every accessible space, and their opportunities fundamentally improved last year. But that we regard as inevitable political obstacles.

[Bauer] Where are those intelligence agents coming from?

[Duchek] One may say from every part of the world.

[Bauer] However, our public does not have much information about those matters....

[Solc] My voters reproached me that I got involved in useless work, that we are rescreening StB members in the Army instead of just getting rid of that unit. Of course, such demands are simplistic and not feasible. Intelligence work is a task for experts and it will take seven years to train a competent intelligence agent; for that period of time we cannot use there individuals who may be reliable citizens but who lack professional qualifications. For that reason, from those 700 men we shall pick men who are highly qualified, and those for whom intelligence work was a kind of internal exile and who kept their distance from internal problems of which we already spoke.

[Bauer] Where will those officers be assigned after rescreening?

[Solc] Under consideration is their assignment to the military intelligence service, to military police, for which many have appropriate college education, and furthermore, to various army posts provided that the individual in question can serve in the military. Some of them will leave for civilian life; the newly organized military police should not serve as some kind of a dumping ground for the less competent ones. On the contrary, we are paying considerable attention to military police because it has no guidelines to follow and it is now being organized in our Army for the first time.

Comments on New Federal Information Service
91CH0314A Prague TVORBA in Czech 23 Jan 91 p 16

[Article by Petr Kuzvar: "More on the Establishment of the Federal Information Service"]

[Text] Shortly before Christmas, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and of Democracy was disestablished and, at the same time, the Federal Information Service was created, headed by the chief of the disestablished office, Jiri Novotny. The public response to the little report, which ran in the press, was very weak or even nonexistent. However, it is appropriate to pause over this matter, to mention certain connections and to pose a few questions.

First of all, it is necessary to state that the pre-November bureaucracy, which was, for the most part, untouched, is generally smartly at work. It discarded the red booklets, it metamorphosed in a number of reorganizations, it is once more nicely crunching paper and, as a result, even human and social fates. A particularly important and dangerous area is the sphere of state security and the political police. And it is precisely here that peculiar disputes and frictions arose in the recent past and that now there has been an even more curious reorganization. Jiri Mueller, the meritorious opposition official and a person regarding whom only the best of references could be found, had to go suddenly.

An absolutely fundamental question insofar as the state political police is concerned is the problem of the subordination and control of this police, which is closely connected with the question of its being abused. Should it remain subordinate to the official structure of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, there is the actual danger of abusing this police and of the gradual expansion of its actual range of activities beyond the limitations of the social optimum ("dirty" operations of a political character, ongoing information gathering regarding "uncomfortable individuals," etc.), or, on the other hand, the possibility for paralyzing desirable activities. Any number of such individuals at the head of the ministry here cannot constitute a permanent guarantee that this will not occur. Even they can be eliminated or will adapt over time; inertia and informal internal legalities governing the functioning of the bureaucratic structure will do their work. The only institutional guarantee here can be the extraction of the state political police from the subordination of the Ministry of the Interior, in other words, from the bureaucratic apparatus, and placing it directly under the highest organ of state power, the elected and regularly changed body, the parliament. That represents the only certain, but not absolute, guarantee against abuse and against the impermissible expansion of actual activities beyond the limitations of the social optimum. However, this was allegedly not the subject of the dispute between Minister of the Interior Langos and Mueller, the former chief of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and of Democracy. Both were allegedly in agreement regarding the fact that

the office should in future be subordinated to the parliament. So what was the reason for recalling Mueller? What is being concealed from the public? Why all of this? The Federal Information Service continues to operate under the jurisdiction of the Federal Ministry of the Interior!

What is actually involved here in the case of the sudden recall of the chief, the disestablishment of an office from one day to the next, and the establishment of something new? According to an article in RESPEKT, No 29, 5 December (Jaroslav Spurny: "Once More From the Basics"), the current chief, Jiri Novotny, has a "great responsibility before God and conscience." The article then continues by saying something which is worth quoting: "This sentence probably expresses the reason why Jiri Mueller was recalled better than the official explanation provided by the ministry." For God's sake! What is going on? After all, the protection of God was invoked and is invoked to this day by the knights of the opposition without fear and shame, such as Vaclav Maly, but also politicians allying themselves along a heroic characteristic path thanks to a vision of election success with expendable individuals who are, essentially, convicted agents of the first magnitude! Even these individuals tend to invoke the protection of God which sounds like impermissible blasphemy, even to me, and I am a staunch atheist.

I ask the questions as a citizen who is not particularly privy to the secrets of police and state security work. I have the right to ask. I have experienced, on my own hide, what it was to be of interest to the StB [State Security] during the pre-November period. I have no desire to return to those same offices for similar interrogations. I do not wish to be forced to stay in those same government issue rooms at the "Hotel Forum II." A change in the image of an officiating holder of power in these rooms is not sufficient for me. Is this not some kind of peculiar game which excludes the public? Why is there this procrastination regarding the subordination of those services to the parliament?

Is not the purpose of the reorganization a quite ordinary purge of those who are not comfortable for those in power? All are simply being fired and only those who are selected will be hired by the Federal Information Service. Let us quote another highly interesting passage in the article by Mr. Spurny in RESPEKT: "The office (alias Federal Service) will be subordinated to the Federal Ministry of the Interior. However, the ministry is not willing to let it go before a structure (and defensive mechanisms) is established which would guarantee that the service cannot be abused and that the service itself will not be able to abuse its authorities."

Actually, what does this mean? It means that the author of the article himself simply listened to officials of the ministry and wrote down that which he found out from them. The entire article is formulated as an unconcealed defense of the leadership of the ministry. There are no voices from the other side or from other sides. This

corresponds completely to the level and style of ministerial councils, but it is in conflict with the style used by RESPEKT. Let us hope that this is a matter of an isolated aberration.

Furthermore: The bureaucratic apparatus of the ministry, this undisputed potential threat to freedom, democracy, and constitutionality, is cast here in the role of a guarantor and arbiter, watching to see that its new "information service" is not abused and, as long as it is not convinced that its image of this organization has been accomplished, refuses to let it go. Is this really a matter of seeing to it that no misuse takes place, or a guarantee that even after the formal change in subordination the ministerial apparatus will exert a decisive influence upon the new structure?

A third conclusion: According to the intent of the highest legislative assembly, its deputies are not autonomous and are not able to assure the establishment and functioning of a federal political police. That is why accommodating officials must take such pains to play their parts....

So what is actually going on? Are constitutional officials actually interested in independence (independence from the executive power of the Federal Ministry of the Interior) and in democratic (parliamentary) control of the state political police; are they interested in its consistent functioning? Or do even people who have risen from the opposition ranks have good reason, from time to time, not to wish for an overly pampering, inquisitive, and consistent political police? Undoubtedly, there is a close connection here involving the investigation of the backgrounds of our most recent historic events.

And what about employing former StB officers in the Office for the Protection of the Constitution? On first glance, it is unambiguous: It is a good thing that a reorganization took place! Former members of the StB will, for the most part, no longer be employed by the new office. In actual fact, however, there can be some fairly basic doubts. Why? First of all, employment involves members who have passed through verification processes. The other StB members had to leave. It is publicly admitted that their network continues to exist. According to all indications, it has in its hands important documents and information. It constitutes a threat. It is a Mafia. Every Mafia maintains itself and defends itself with the assistance of "omerta," the principle of silence. This is the weapon against disclosing the network. He who violates this principle is dangerous to the Mafia and, on the other hand, constitutes a chance for its opponents. He can be very successful in police actions, in the destruction of the Mafia structure. The Italian police knows about this. Not only as far as the Sicilian Mafia is concerned, but even possibly in the case of the Red Brigades. They even stimulated violation of the omerta principle by promising no prosecution or by promising low degrees of punishment. They knew what they were doing. Although several criminals will escape adequate

punishment, at that price there will be the opportunity to destroy the entire criminal conspiracy.

As far as I know, several members of the StB offered to collaborate and actually assisted in uncovering the structures of the state security apparatus and its Mafia type successor network. Naturally, these people can play on both sides and lead investigations along false trails. However, that is a job for the new employees of the political police. They must guard their colleagues and constantly vet them. The fact is that without them, without their knowledge and experience, it is not possible to uncover the fantastic structures which are, moreover, tied to foreign secret services; it is not possible to uncover and liquidate them. Was all this thoroughly considered? Or did the existing office begin doing its work far too consistently and was it necessary to slow down developments?

How are things actually? Will someone give me an answer? Am I wrong? In contrast to the gentlemen from SPIEGEL and EXPRES, I would truly like to be wrong.

Hegenbart Gives His Version of Recent Events

91CH0213A Prague LIDOVÁ DEMOKRACIE in Czech
15 Dec 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with R. Hegenbart by Antonin Hostalek; place and date not given: "I Will Not Talk Anymore"]

[Text] [Hostalek] Mr. Hegenbart, this interview with you has finally arrived. I would like to begin by recalling what Yakovlev, the number-two man after Gorbachev, said. In May 1989 he announced that there would be a change also in our country. But first Shcherbitskiy would have to go in the Ukraine, and Honnecker in the GDR. Sometime in August, when that did happen, I read an interview with you in IZVESTIYA. You spoke of incomprehension, protectionism, communist klans, and about the need for immediate changes also in our country. And then I read another interview with you in the Soviet press immediately after November. I liked that interview, too. What happened was merely what the people had wanted, you said. But then I read further interviews with you in our press, and I was very disappointed. Do you know why?

[Hegenbart] No, I don't.

[Hostalek] Because you sounded like Jakes's brother. You did not know anything. You had not been informed of anything.

[Hegenbart] Probably because something with which I had nothing to do was being attributed to me. I do not enjoy being forced to keep repeating that I really had nothing to do with Security's brutality on 17 November. Please understand what I am saying. I am not in much of a mood for an interview even now.

[Hostalek] You must understand what I am saying. We have agreed on this interview, and I must put these

questions to you. Especially now, after Mr. Dolejsi's article in EXPRES. He identifies you as the chief conspirator.

[Hegenbart] I distance myself from the statements Mr. Dolejsi made. All allegations regarding my person I regard as political demagoguery.

[Hostalek] And aside from that?

[Hegenbart] Mr. Dolejsi ought to substantiate everything properly. I do not wish to comment on his article.

[Hostalek] Alright. I will ask you about something else. Have you seen the British film "Czechmate" on TV?

[Hegenbart] Yes, I have. It is a distortion of facts. I have not participated with Lorenc, or even with Mlynar, in the preparation of any secret plan. Perhaps the BBC will be more specific.

[Hostalek] But you dealt with Mr. Mlynar.

[Hegenbart] Yes, but in another connection and after 27 November. On the basis of a task I was assigned.

[Hostalek] Have you dealt with Dr. Sabata before November?

[Hegenbart] No, I have not.

[Hostalek] Several people are claiming that you have.

[Hegenbart] Then let them or Dr. Sabata be more specific. Evidently they are either mistaken or lying. Lately that has not been unusual so far as my person is concerned.

[Hostalek] Have you read the article in MLADA FRONTA on the occasion of 17 November?

[Hegenbart] Yes, I have. Slowly but surely I am deleting that daily from my vocabulary. It seems to me that they have set themselves the task of making me seem to the public as an idiot, a dogmatist, as some kind of architect of the old order by means of a conspiracy. Let them sweep before their own door. In their essays they often raise a series of suggestive questions that are in conflict with the truth. In my latest letter to Mr. Sefcik, the editor in chief, I wrote that I, too, could raise questions: Is there some kind of secret conspiracy against me by the Communists, trade unions and the Interior Ministry? Has not also MLADA FRONTA done enough to that end since January 1990? Has it not done enough to blacken my reputation and to discredit me in public? I, unlike many of them, did not need to change coats. My speeches and articles prove that. I can produce them as evidence.

[Hostalek] You do not have to. We know of them.

[Hegenbart] Then you also know of my speech at the meeting of the CPCZ [Communist Party of Czechoslovakia] Central Committee in March 1989. And at the next meeting Jakes instructed Pitra not to recognize me in the debate. I was preparing then for the December

1989 plenum. The tension was growing. There was unusual activity in every sector, and not only in the CPCZ Central Committee. I remember talking with Ladislav Adamec at the end of October or early November. He wanted me to suggest names for various positions. He said that he would "make" me [Central Committee] secretary for ideology. I remember a discussion with Valter Komarek, the director of the Forecasting Institute. I learned from him that they were feverishly helping Adamec. Komarek gave me a report on the national economy and told me that I must not reveal that fact to anyone. As if I had not known where our economy had gotten itself even with Adamec's help. After all, Adamec was also chief of the CPCZ Central Committee's Economic Department, and for many years had been deputy premier of the Czech Government, then premier, and a member of the Central Committee. Komarek told me that they had to support Adamec because after all he was better known than I was. About that time Komarek also asked me whether I would be willing to serve as their interior minister. I categorically rejected the offer, saying that I would be interested in scientific and technological development or the environment. In summer I had a small clash with Komarek. When he was expounding on our economic prospects, I casually remarked that he ought to tone down his theoretical essays, because he had worked in Cuba and now the Cubans were organizing ways to correct the mistakes. Komarek was very offended, but smiled after a while. Therefore I was hardly able to overcome my amazement that specifically he was offering me such an important portfolio. In addition to preparing forecasts of long-term development, I said to myself, they appeared to be working also on supplying cadres for society.

[Hostalek] What you are saying is interesting. It indicates that traps were being set for Jakes from every direction. Evidently those cassettes from Hradek were intended to discredit him on purpose.

[Hegenbart] Perhaps. But as the highest representative, he should have chosen the form and manner of his resignation befitting his prominent position within the party and in government, instead of bringing down others with himself.

[Hostalek] What did Jakes actually think?

[Hegenbart] He himself knows best what he thought. That is becoming increasingly true with the passage of time.

[Hostalek] Was he afraid of someone?

[Hegenbart] He feared the members of Revival the most.

[Hostalek] Did he have any dealings with them?

[Hegenbart] He himself probably did not, but he certainly must have delegated somebody to deal with them. But not me. He did not confide in me that much.

[Hostalek] But he let you manage Department 13?

[Hegenbart] I was not there that long. And the conjuring tricks of politics were played elsewhere. For that he had better qualified sectors and institutions, and persons in positions higher than mine. And you are enormously overestimating the influence and power of that department. Its correct name was Department of State Administration, and within it there were divisions for legal, defense and security policies, each division with its own responsible chief. But they had no right to encroach on the authority of state agencies. Many people today view that department and its structure through the eyes of their own practice in the 1950's. But that practice was no longer valid in our department. Moreover, Jakes had suggested to me that I was not the administrative type. As the chief of such a department with three divisions, I was to remain in the background and essentially nameless, instead of publicly presenting critical views regarding party policy. I simply allowed myself too much within a narrow governing group that reserved for itself the right to know the truth and to decide everything. They thought I would be their supporting pillar, but I had slightly different ideas.

[Hostalek] But look, there is some logic in it. Specifically for that reason, people are of the opinion that you could have been in the background of 17 November.

[Hegenbart] I could have been, but the essential thing is that I was not.

[Hostalek] Do you have at least some hypothesis? Was the brutality the purpose, the result of an agreement? Was it intended to be a sort of starter to set off the entire campaign?

[Hegenbart] All of what you are saying is possible. The brutality could have been the result of a certain impatience on the part of some people. It could have been the result of fears that somebody other than who was expected to do so might become the leader. Or perhaps to prevent somebody from coming in ahead of someone else.

[Hostalek] Stepan mentioned a second center that directed operations.

[Hegenbart] He has the right to say anything he likes. But he should present supporting facts. To the best of my knowledge, the policy center was the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee, and for Prague the presidium of the CPCZ Municipal Committee. The Prague organs had authority over Security operations on the territory of Prague. To my knowledge, that was always so. Units of the Interior Ministry were also under their command.

[Hostalek] What does the concept of Prague's municipal organs include?

[Hegenbart] The entire Security apparatus under responsible and competent commanders. Only the chief secretary for Prague could give them policy guidelines, after prior approval by the Presidium of the CPCZ Central Committee. Then there was also the Committee for

Directing Party Work in Bohemia and Moravia. I include that, too, in the concept of Prague.

[Hostalek] Well, that was Prague. You have often been called Moscow's man. I know that at the beginning of 1989 officials of the Russian embassy and consulate were contacting the progressive members of the CPCZ Central Committee and also the members of Renewal. The embassy officials were evidently members of the KGB.

[Hegenbart] You know that, but I don't. But tell me, which of the embassies has no one working for them from such services? If you have me in mind, I can reveal to you that I have not had any contact with the KGB. If I have been called Moscow's man, I do not know whether to regard that as praise or as a rebuke. I have simply been a supporter of Gorbachev's policies and of his reform.

[Hostalek] But you are also a friend of Lomakin, the Russian ambassador.

[Hegenbart] If you regard as friendship meeting him twice a year at receptions, and going fishing with him, then so be it. There is perhaps nothing wrong with that. I have been on friendly terms also with other ambassadors, even Western ones. But Mr. Lomakin was a very pleasant man.

[Hostalek] What did you talk about when you went fishing with him?

[Hegenbart] What do you think people at such levels can say to each other? Look, why don't you stop these suggestive questions? I know where they are heading. Why are you journalists always suggesting to the public ideas about some sort of conspiracy of mine with Moscow? Too bad that Moscow has never told me that I am its man. Then I probably would have been bolder. Why is attention always focused only on me? Has it never occurred to you that the purpose may be to divert attention from the real organizers? I repeat: I have never prepared, discussed or approved any plans for that brutal intervention. I will not talk about that any more with journalists. I promised you this interview, and I wanted to keep my word. Even though I know that my word is not of any value, either. Or do you think it is?

[Hostalek] Regrettably, I do not know.

Husak Denies Accusations by Ex-Minister Barak
91CH0329A Bratislava NOVE SLOVO in Slovak
17 Jan 91 p 14

[Article by Viliam Plevza: "Talk With Gustav Husak: Falsification of Historical Truth"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] During the five decades that have passed since Gustav Husak played a role in the anti-Fascist struggle during World War II, there appeared on the pages of newspapers, journals and books, and on radio and television quite a few reports which evaluated, applauded, or disparaged his role in the struggle for national liberation. They ascribed to him—

and recently in newspaper reports the former Minister of Culture Vladimir Kadlec also imputed to him—the intention to sell out Slovakia to the Bolsheviks, even though he pushed for, even within the inner circle of the movement to which he belonged, a Czechoslovak orientation to the struggle. It is a paradox, that at the beginning of December 1990 the former CSR minister of the interior 1953-61 accused him of what even those who were getting the gallows ready for him at the beginning of the fifties could not prove: That he made a pact with the State Security Headquarters and the chief of its anticomunist section Dr. Imrich Sucky. In his recollections, which R. Barak published in CESKE NOVINY on 6 December 1990, he states, with reference to Sucky's testimony obtained during their joint detention in Ostrava:

"A group of people used to meet in a Bratislava wine bar, played cards and discussed topical issues concerning the developments in Slovakia and problems connected with the advance of the Soviet Army. In the group was Interior Minister of the Slovak State Alexander Mach, the best paid lawyer of a firm in Slovakia, Dr. Gustav Husak, also Ladislav Novomesky and other people, different ones from time to time. These were mostly the so-called salon communists, as they were referred to in Bratislava." Barak insists that Husak "displayed a haughty manner during interrogation, denied the allegations, appealed to Mach," but according to Sucky he is said to have "softened his attitude only after he got several slaps in the face." When the chief of the anticomunist section of State Security allegedly wanted to indict Husek for his activity in the fifth illegal Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, possibly turn him over to the Gestapo in Brno, "Mach strongly protested. He said that by doing that they would lose the means for the surveillance of the Communists' activities, that is, the main source of regular and precise information which Husak provided to Mach. He added that President Tiso himself requires such information in the interest of the state."

Mach's advice, according to Sucky's phantasmagoria, was unequivocal:

"With the advance of the Red Army, the appetite of the Slovak Communists to work openly is growing as well. And we must know what is going on. Cultivate Husak, Mr. Inspector, he is not their man!"

And Rudolf Barak adds without blushing:

"And so Sucky really did begin to cultivate him and look out for him."

And the reward? The "willingness" of the German Army, which closed access roads to the insurgent territory, to allow "registered in the name of Husak" to travel by car, and not only him, but also Dr. Jozef Lettrich and V. Josko. It was supposed to have happened on the instructions given by the highest German authorities in

Slovakia, on the initiative of the "German consul general" (!!!), who, by the way, did not work in Bratislava. Hitler's legation was headed by Ambassador Ludin.

Representative historic documents attest to the fact that Gustav Husak held his own even in confrontations with State Security. Perhaps because of some lucky breaks (they always had to let him go because of lack of proof of any antistate activities), but more likely thanks to his ingenuity and bravery with which he stood up to interrogation and disproved the accusations leveled at him and his friends. In spite of the fact that the editors of CESKE NOVINY did not expect to be able to obtain and publish G. Husak's own reaction to the views of R. Barak and Dr. I. Sucky, on 6 January Gustav Husak answered questions which I put to him on this point. I am quoting them as they were recorded on the tape recorder.

[Plevza] The focus of Rudolf Barak's attacks is on the problems of the resistance.

[Husak] It does not concern only the resistance. He also expresses his suspicions about how I became the secretary general. I must answer that also, because we have here not only Barak and Sucky, but also others who are "contributing" to this campaign, and even doing so with an anti-Slovak slant. Barak in particular is seething with anger. In 1968 they at first rehabilitated him. But later there were doubts: On what basis should he be rehabilitated? Was his trial right and proper? Was it not? He obviously learned about that, so that in his current attitude we can detect vengefulness, bias. But at issue is historical truth. I received some questions from Professor V. Mencl who is heading the state commission for writing the history of that period, and I shall be glad to answer them when I feel a little bit better.

And Barak, of course, is well informed about how things actually stood. And Sucky? As a convicted collaborator he wrote and said everything that was asked of him.

[Plevza] Barak's testimony is based on his discussions with Sucky in the Ostrava prison.

[Husak] That was idle prison talk.

[Plevza] And it is not even authorized.

[Husak] It is unconscionable. A simple person can ask: How is it that after 50 years these matters are dragged out, why is Barak poking around in them just now?

[Plevza] Sucky insists that during the time of the Slovak State you used to meet with Mach, that you played cards together, and so on. Did you know him already before the war?

[Husak] Not at all, at that time I only knew him by name as a journalist.

[Plevza] Sucky's testimony, which is quoted by Barak, brings to mind also the previously mentioned slanders about the salon, cafe communists....

[Husak] As far as contacts with former minister Mach are concerned, I never had any; neither personal nor social. Basically, I never met him in person, and I never maintained any contacts with him directly or indirectly. The statement about some meetings in a wine bar is totally made up. First, I never had any such meetings at all, much less with Mach or his companions. That is a brazen fabrication and an attempt to compromise me. Various intellectuals used to meet in wine bars, but I never met with a group in which Mach was a member. I considered him to be a political opponent, a representative of a Fascist regime, and where I used to belong is well known. Sucky's statements about my contacts with Mach, State Security, and the apparatus of the State Security are lies, fabrications, and, as I already said, attempts to discredit me. That applies to the entire period of the war and after the war.

[Plevza] According to Barak's recollections, Sucky wanted to indict you for your activities in the fifth illegal central leadership of the Slovak Communist Party, Mach was against it and even the President of the Slovak Republic, Dr. Jozef Tiso, was interested in having you continue your activities in the communist movement, because it was said to be to their advantage....

[Husak] In my experience, neither the police nor the leading officials of the Slovak State had any information about the preparations for the uprising or about my activities in this respect. Certainly not from me, and as I later learned from personal documents, neither from the other leaders. And therefore they were blind and the uprising took them by surprise. Sucky's and Mach's statements have no foundation; they cannot present any argument, any documentation.

Barak has been minister of interior since 1953. As a political player he shared not only in the orchestration of our trials in 1954, but he also orchestrated the so-called rehabilitation following the trials. If what Sucky is alleged to have said, and with which Barak concurs, is true, why did he not use it then and at other occasions when my activities were being denigrated?

[Plevza] We must not forget that even after the trials of the so-called bourgeois nationalists in the Slovak Communist Party in April 1954, Barak continued to be minister of interior for another seven years, that he was in charge of prisons, including those where he served time, and furthermore, that he sabotaged everything that could have led to the rehabilitation of unjustly convicted people. He knew very well about all the letters which you, as well as the other unjustly convicted, wrote, especially after the 20th Congress of the CPSU, to Novotny and the politburo. Barak, as the minister, received on his table reports of the investigators Doubek and Kohoutek, who admitted to sharing in fabricating the accusations against the indicted, to reprisals, torture, and the most severe law breaking in preparing the political trials in the fifties. In spite of that, he did not move a finger to make the truth come out and to have justice done.

[Husak] Now he is trying to wiggle out of it by saying that the politburo ordered him to do it. Why? I would like to mention another one of Barak's insinuations: That during my alleged trip to the extraordinary congress of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia [CPCZ] in Prague following the Soviet intervention in August 1968 they pulled me out of the car in Breclav.

[Plevza] It is known, after all, that immediately after 21 August 1968 you never left Bratislava, not until your departure with Svoboda for the talks in Moscow.

[Husak] But what does Barak deduce from that? That someone bought me there, a Breznev man. And then the question is, how did I get to go with the President to Moscow? I already honestly said that I talked with Ludvik Svoboda by telephone. He asked me (since the other leading functionaries of the party and the state were interned—comment by V.Plevza) to go with him.

A democratic environment assumes and demands the search for historical truth. In an effort to prevent the substitution of one thought totalitarianism with another, it rejects a black and white interpretation of history, even if these two colors exchange their places. History cannot be distorted, it must be truthfully explained. Neither does it tolerate false moralizing and mystifications generated by anger and hate. For that reason we think it useful to familiarize our readers with the above testimonies.

Slovak Historian Considers Contemporary Issues 91CH0212B Prague FORUM in Czech 11 Dec 90 p 16

[Interview with Jan Mlynarik, member of the Federal Assembly's House of Nations, by Sylva Danickova; place and date not given: "We Are Witnessing Something Unusual"]

[Text] Jan Mlynarik, a member of the Federal Assembly's House of Nations, was originally a historian by profession. His teaching career was interrupted "when the armies marched in." He found a job as a stagehand in the National Theater, and later as stoker in the Slavia Cafe. He continued his historical research on his own, investigating primarily the deportation of ethnic Germans from Czechoslovakia. As one of the Chartists, he was arrested in 1981 and spent 13 months in Ruzyně Prison. A year later he was banished from the country. Living in Bavaria, he pursued a career as a writer and publisher. This year he returned to Prague. Besides being a member of the House of Nations, he is teaching Slovak history in the School of Philosophy and History at Charles University. We met after one of his lectures.

[Danickova] Mr. Mlynarik, as a historian could you give us your assessment of the situation in our country? How does it appear to you along its axis of development, from the Premyslide kingdom through the reigns of Charles IV and George of Podebrady, the period after the battle of Bila Hora, the Renewal, and the brief segment of history that was our First Republic?

[Mlynarik] My field is modern history, and I am unable to review in a few sentences such a long period. But I think we are witnessing something unusual. We are continuing what was interrupted. Continuing also the optimism of the years around the time of the republic's formation in 1918, the birth of our national independence. At the same time, our prospects are much better. After the Treaty of Versailles in 1918, Europe was disintegrated, particularized. Semifascist, totalitarian, and completely fascist, Nazi regimes emerged. One war had just ended, and another one was being prepared.

In contrast, the end of this century has brought something our forefathers did not even dream of: The desire of George of Podebrady for cooperation among the peoples of Europe is being realized. A historian finds that very encouraging. After all the catastrophes that preceded this period, we are able to view our present—not only in Czechoslovakia, but in Europe and the world as well—and to compare it with the past.

Of course, we cannot assume that everything in the future will turn out for us the way we would like. But I am optimistic and think that we will be entering the 21st century with a positive message for future generations.

[Danickova] The tense situation regarding Slovakia is continuing. You are a member of the House of Nations representing Central Slovakia Kraj. You are living in Prague and speak Czech. Fair play would require me to speak Slovak. I do not. But I must say that, whenever I read a Slovak book, Slovak sounds nice, close and natural to me. I have many splendid friends in Slovakia, and I include you too among them. For me there is no dividing line between us and Slovakia, although it is only natural that I do respect the differences. I regard any quarrels as deceitful and nonsensical. What is your view on this serious contemporary issue?

[Mlynarik] We have here a whole range of questions, both historical and contemporary ones. It is being overlooked at present that our two nations developed for centuries in a certain symbiosis. That we have here an unusual similarity of language and a similarity of mentality as well. Until the middle of this century, for instance, Biblical Czech was the liturgical language of a part of Slovak society, of the Lutherans. In the course of its history, Slovakia was enriched by the contributions of Czech expatriates, especially after the battle of Bila Hora. There were very lively contacts between intellectuals in the 19th century. On their part, Czechs would not be able to imagine national renewal without Kollar and Safarik. Many Czechs had worked in Slovakia even before the Czechoslovak Republic's formation. In Bohemia and Moravia there was a strong Slovakophile movement helping to integrate the Slovak question into the Czech question that Masaryk was advocating; the destiny of the Slovaks was regarded in a certain sense as the destiny of the Czechs. And among Slovak intellectuals in the past, the destiny of the Czechs was regarded as the destiny of the Slovaks. Thus your professed

predilection for, or identification with, the Slovak language and culture draws from this profound background.

After the Czechoslovak Republic's formation, the Czech intellectuals who educated a generation of Slovak professionals and intellectuals were virtually pioneers. Within a few years Slovakia made up for what decades and centuries of forced Magyarization had caused.

Professor Masaryk and General Stefanik played a unique role in gaining independence and statehood for Czechoslovakia. In a sense they are symbols, embodiments, of Czechoslovak statehood. Unfortunately, we tend to forget their admonition that we act jointly, in close unity. Ignorance of history also plays a certain role here. Under the totalitarian system of the past 40 years, history was actually erased, not just falsified. There was a quite obvious attempt to deprive the nation of its historical thinking, of its historical awareness, and hence also of its historical roots. Whenever an occupying power, and not just Soviet power, overran a country and subjugated a nation, the occupying power always strived to deprive that nation of such identification marks of a profound historical background. Therefore today we are confronted with a situation where some Slovak members of the Federal Assembly are acting there as if they were completely ignorant of our common history and are distorting that history. They introduce some elements of communist history into their speeches, claiming that crowds of Slovak workers were shot at on Masaryk's orders, etc.

Under the First Republic there were indeed social struggles and clashes in which also lives were lost. But consider the reality of Central Europe between the two world wars. If we know that in the eastern parts of Poland there was a civil war in which thousands died; if we consider what happened in Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, in Germany after 1933, or in Austria, and how many casualties the social, class and political struggles claimed there; then Czechoslovakia with its few tens of casualties during those 20 years was the country where force was used the least, and where there were fewer casualties than in any of the neighboring countries.

To the contrary, Czechoslovakia became a sort of island of democracy in Central Europe, providing a home for emigrants from other European nations. A large democratic emigration arrived from Russia soon after the republic's formation. Then after 1919 there was the emigration from Hungary, including also the communist emigration that did not behave too loyally toward the Czechoslovak government. The Austrian and especially the German emigration arrived in the 1930's. All these positive things during the 20 years of the First Republic are often forgotten. Such ignorance then breeds views which are inadequate and now politically damaging in Parliament, especially when voiced by certain Slovak nationalists, to the Slovak nation's reputation. But as I have said, this stems more from a lack of knowledge than from prejudice.

[Danickova] You used the word "ignorance." In conjunction with that, I would like to ask you about a problem you have studied: the problem of the Sudeten Germans. That problem is again becoming timely, in both its political and economic aspects. Could you shed some light on it?

[Mlynarik] Essentially the point was to solve the nationality question, which had been a very timely one from the very birth of the Czechoslovak Republic. Masaryk said that the state would need 50 years for its consolidation. The First Republic lasted only 20 years. Through a coincidence of circumstances, that 50th anniversary came in 1968. Czechoslovakia was formed not as a nation-state, but as a multinational state. There were actually more ethnic Germans than Slovaks, the [other] state-forming nations [in addition to the Czechs]. The ethnic Germans comprised not only the Sudeten Germans, who numbered over 3.0 million, but also the approximately 180,000 Carpathian Germans who, too, were driven out in 1945 and the following years. This is a very painful problem because it was then that the peaceful coexistence of the Czech and Slovak nations with their ethnic German fellow citizens ceased. The Germans had settled here in the 13th and 14th centuries, and their cultural level was high. I think that this forced disruption of coexistence could have been avoided. Incidentally, I am not alone in holding this view; it is supported also by other historians, including Milos Hajek, for example. He clearly raises the question as to whether the big powers would have urged Czechoslovakia to deport its ethnic Germans, had not the Czechoslovak government—and President Benes, in particular—been insisting so vehemently on doing so?

A long series of tragedies occurred here. The Sudeten Germans numbered fewer than 240,000 civilians. Naturally, this does not include the 150,000 who fell in battle. There are many mass graves of Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, and we will have to confront that question as well.

As a historian, I have studied this question. Restored after World War II, Czechoslovak democracy failed and became an easy prey of the Communists in 1948. We overlook the fact that when we established the horrors and crimes of Communist terror in the 1950's, we failed to explain the source of so much hatred in this country, one with such profound democratic traditions established by Masaryk. We cannot attribute that hatred solely to the Communists. It manifested itself here especially after 1945, in time of complete peace. Atrocities, murders and robberies were committed here in conjunction with the forceful resettlement of the Sudeten Germans.

There is also the question of the property of the ethnic Germans. This is a political question which I have already raised in Parliament, and I intend to speak out on it also in the future.

Like other people whose property was stolen or robbed, also the Sudeten Germans ought to get back somehow a part of their property. But I realize that the generations which grew up here do not intend to return. They have already set roots in the FRG. If those people do decide to come here, then perhaps only as businessmen, or as visitors and tourists to our mountains.

I brought this question up in my maiden speech in Parliament. The reply I got from the highest places was that we had enough other urgent and painful problems, and there was no need to expand their scope by adding to them also the question of the Sudeten and Carpathian Germans. Naturally, I agree. But that question is a part of rectifying the wrongs committed here, not just from 1948 or 1954 on, but since 1945, or already since Munich and the post-Munich period.

It will be remembered that the FRG has positively settled accounts with the Poles, Hungarians, and French, and also with Israel, paying large sums as compensation for the atrocities committed against Jews and in the mentioned countries. So far there has been a settlement with Czechoslovakia only for the people on whom medical experiments were performed. Which means that no compensation (on an adequate scale) has been paid for the atrocities the Nazis committed against us. Judging by German practice, the Germans owe us a lot. Evidently this problem will be solved only when we ourselves solve adequately the question of the property of the Sudeten and Carpathian Germans. I think that this is a problem for politicians and relatively long-term negotiations. But I am confident that this question will be solved positively, because it involves our immediate neighbors with whom we want to live on good terms and enter Europe together. And that backlog, that millstone of atrocities from 1945, must also be removed.

[Danickova] I would now like to turn our attention to Parliament. It has an unimaginably huge workload, in the form of about 160 legislative bills that will have to be enacted before Christmas. In your opinion, how does Parliament rate in terms of professionalism, and how much hope is there that it will be able to cope with its responsibility and workload?

[Mlynarik] We are beginning to learn democracy and also common causes. It is an art to advocate common causes. As a historian, and in a certain sense also as a politician in exile, I allow myself to comment only on those questions which I hopefully understand or am beginning to understand. In Parliament, unfortunately, we have many people who will speak out on any and every question, which means also questions on which they are not qualified to comment, and will resort to nationalist demagoguery and similar excesses.

I think that Parliament needs about six months to find itself. Until it becomes capable of deliberating with real understanding and responsibly as a body, rather than just between experts, the bills and other legislation.

Of course, Parliament comprises many experts, lawyers, political scientists, theoreticians—outstanding people who, despite their huge workload, do their utmost to resolve the situation by enacting laws that are as objective as possible. But we are pressed for time, and there are very many things we can only nibble at. They are a huge mountain that we cannot swallow and analyze all at once. The law we enacted for returning property confiscated on the basis of decrees issued in 1954 and 1962 is only a partial law, a very imperfect piece of legislation. Before that law, we enacted one for returning the property that had been confiscated from the religious orders. That law, too, covers only a part of the property the religious orders had, at most only their church property as such. It might be said that we are taking bites out of the huge amount of material before us, and I am rather skeptical that during our two-year term we will be able to solve everything to the highest possible degree of public satisfaction, so that many people will not again feel deceived, cheated or defrauded. Which can easily happen in the case of such large projects.

I am able to say that our Parliament, when it meets in commissions, caucuses, committees and full sessions, puts in many hours. We often leave at 10 or 11 pm or even later. At the same time, we also have an obligation to keep in touch with our constituents. I specifically with my constituents in Central Slovakia Kraj, in Novohrad, Lucenec, Lucenec Okres and Velky Krtis Okres. People come to us with a variety of requests, both personal and public. Thus the workload of a member of Parliament is truly a heavy one.

[Danickova] You are working in Parliament and traveling to your constituency in Slovakia. To my knowledge, your family is in Bavaria. You are teaching on the Faculty of Philosophy. Simply stated, you are finally able to do what you like doing and what is also useful to the public. That must be gratifying. Do you lack anything?

[Mlynarik] I am satisfied that, at the end of my career as a historian and citizen, I am able to give my country and my fellow citizens what I regard as my best. I would like to train a few students here at the university. Until 1969, I taught at the Academy of Fine Arts. But then normalization arbitrarily put an end to the work I had immensely enjoyed doing. Here on the faculty I am teaching Slovak history. In Bavaria, where I lived for nearly eight years, I did not want for anything of a material nature. That is a very rich country. What I did miss were the friends I had left behind here, and with whom I maintained contact through correspondence and by telephone. Because I am so busy, I miss them also now.

[Danickova] What would be the most important for those who at present are in responsible positions, making decisions that affect the nation's destiny?

[Mlynarik] They should realize that we are at the beginning of a great work which we will be able to master only jointly. Furthermore, that we are starting out from a

40-year period of totalitarianism. And if we include our limited democracy in 1945-48 and the war itself, then it is actually a 50-year period. After 50 years, we are finally able to do fruitful and dedicated work for ourselves. We are able to build and erect a common project. My wish is that we be aware of being a single entirety, a single state. That when Europe receives and recognizes us, it do so as the Czechoslovak entirety, the Czechoslovak state, a state founded on certain ideals that have won it respect in Europe and before the entire world. Ideals which today, I believe, the head of state, President Vaclav Havel, so clearly documents and presents.

[Danickova] Thank you for this interview.

POLAND

Political Structure Before Parliamentary Elections

91EP0238C Warsaw LAD in Polish No 2, 13 Jan 91
pp 1, 3

[Interview with Jacek Maziarski, chief, Political Services Staff, Presidential Chancellery, by Maciej Letowski, on 11 December 1990; place not given: "The Left—the Center—the Right"]

[Text] [Letowski] I would like to know your opinion on the transformation of the political structure in Poland after the presidential elections and before the parliamentary elections. Let us begin with the group that is closest to you, the Center Accord. What will be the consequences of Walesa's victory for the Center Accord? We may say that it has achieved two of its main goals, which made it dynamic and were the cement that held together very different communities—Walesa has become president and the left wing of Solidarity has been removed from power. The implementation of their goals always constitutes a critical moment in the development of all political entities.

[Maziarski] There were more goals than these. Our third goal is to build organizational structures. For the Center to survive we need an efficient organizational structure. Achieving this objective is still at a very early stage. Our fourth goal is to participate in the parliamentary elections which will be a much more difficult endeavor than participation in the presidential campaign. Therefore, our work will not weaken but will rather be stepped up.

In response to your question about the new cement for the Center, the driving force for its further development, I would point to a certain philosophy in which we should include Christian values, a market economy, attachment to national tradition, and a certain type of conservatism. This coincides expressly with the mentality of the Walesa constituency. If this were the case we could count on the support of 30 to 40 percent of the electorate.

[Letowski] Can the election committees of Walesa become embryos of local Center Accord structures?

[Maziarski] I am not sure. After all, Walesa was a supraparty candidate. A very broad front of national understanding for the election of Walesa emerged in the latest phase of the campaign. A segment of these people and communities will definitely not form a base for the Center. Of course, election committees have helped us to find people who will become the assets of the Center Accord in the future.

[Letowski] The Center is an accord of not only people but also political groups. Could it be that in the forthcoming parliamentary elections they will want to look for their own ways to the Sejm to the detriment of the power of the Center?

[Maziarski] Initially I also thought so, but now I believe that a quite strong and unified core of the Center Accord has emerged. Most of the people who have joined the Center have signed up with the Accord rather than with one of the groups which are its component parts. Figures who do not have separate shop signs of their own are a numerical majority in the Center. Under the circumstances, even if some group which now belongs to the Center Accord resolved to go its own way, its decision would not be essential to the future destiny of the Center Accord.

[Letowski] However, I believe that members of the Center who have not become affiliated with one of the several ideological centers existing in the Center Accord (Liberal or Christian-Democratic) have little in the way of already-formed ideological and political opinions but rather carry on the quite typical reluctance of participants in the civic movement to operate within political parties. Does this reluctance persist?

[Maziarski] Yes, it does, but it is rather the mistrust of an organizational nature (associated with belonging to a party) rather than mistrust in terms of ideology or a view of the world. After all, values which the Center affirms are natural, and do not call for a particular quest, explanation, and persuasion, at least as far as this particular segment of the electorate is concerned. In turn, the reluctance to unite in a political party should be overcome by devices of an organizational nature.

[Letowski] Therefore, will a congress of the Center Accord be held soon to address these issues?

[Maziarski] In the immediate future, something in the nature of a "small congress" will be held—a Center Accord conference which will outline the program and come up with an answer to the question of whether conditions are ripe for making the Center Accord more cohesive organizationally. I believe that we do not have a choice because once you say "a" you have to say "b." A congress is to be held promptly after this conference. I would like the congress to be held before the parliamentary elections.

[Letowski] Are you in favor of the rapid merger of the Center Accord into a unified group, or do you come out instead in favor of preserving a loose arrangement of

separate entities? Cohesion brings about greater efficiency, but it might also cause the withdrawal of some parties or associations from the Center Accord.

[Maziarski] There are more tensions than that; along with parties and associations, there are also civic committees in the Center Accord, and there are structures which are close to the union, such as the Democratic Forum "Mazowsze." Therefore, we may see right away that we do not have an opportunity to transform the Center Accord into a monolithic party. The Center will never be cohesive, and it will always be a federation. The efficiency of its operation will depend on whether an effective leadership of the entity will emerge rather than on whether everyone is going to march in step.

[Letowski] At present, Walesa is putting together both his entourage at the Belweder and the composition of the government. This may cause some leading figures of the Center Accord to take these jobs to the detriment of the Center.

[Maziarski] Indeed, there is a problem, but every political group is built into power arrangements whether it wants to be or not. Moreover, had this not happened, the electorate could have said that the Center has lost the presidential elections. Therefore, failing to take the step could be a mistake.

[Letowski] Will the fact that the candidate nominated by the Center Accord has become president serve the Center well, or be its liability?

[Maziarski] In the parliamentary elections, it will certainly still serve well, but I would not know what will happen a year from now. Certainly, the prestige of Walesa will not be used up so rapidly as to make him a liability to the Center Accord. To my mind, the fact that we were the first group to nominate Walesa as a candidate will bring dividends for some time to come, but let us not be under a delusion. This is not what the future of the Center should be based on. It should be build on a solid foundation of the view of the world and programs.

[Letowski] Are there constituencies which do not belong to the Center Accord but should belong?

[Maziarski] The range has already been determined in principle; the left and right limits of the Center Accord have been drawn, and they are not going to change. In the very rich mosaic of Polish political life there are very many initiatives which fit within this range and perhaps will show interest in cooperating with us. After all, our chances are better if we proceed together rather than fight separately. The latter attitude may be the undoing of many of us in the parliamentary elections.

[Letowski] The presidential campaign has brought closer to the Center Accord groups which pose a certain problem. I mean the SD [Democratic Party], PAX [Christian Social Association], and the ZChN [Christian-National Union]. Was this a strictly tactical rapprochement, or will this have a continuation?

[Maziarski] We should expressly separate PAX and the SD on the one hand from the ZChN on the other hand. PAX and the SD are the entities which are retiring from the scene and will have to undergo the same process which befell the PZPR [Polish United Worker's Party], that is, liquidation and division. Only the reformist segments of these organizations will find a niche in the Center. On the other hand, the people who would like to preserve the remnants of the old system will not fit in.

The ZChN is an absolutely different matter. This is a new entity which did not belong to the PRL [People's Republic of Poland] system. Therefore, it is up to it to decide whether it would like to draw closer to the Center or to keep its line to date. As of now, the ZChN is merely a close ally of ours.

[Letowski] Let us now look at the main adversaries of the Center Accord in the future parliamentary elections. Let us begin with what is to the left of the Center, the postcommunist formations (Cimoszewicz, the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic], almost 10 percent of the electorate in presidential elections), and the camp of the post-Solidarity left (Mazowiecki, the Democratic Union, almost 20 percent of the votes in the presidential elections). In total, these two entities may count on pulling 30 percent. This is a lot.

[Maziarski] I suspect that they may gain even more seats because in the presidential elections they were dominated by Walesa's candidacy. They have an interesting set of politicians, and therefore they will not have difficulty fielding a ticket of influential figures and candidates for deputies and senators. Moreover, in the parliamentary elections they will hold the favorable position of a group not responsible for the government. I believe that this bloc has an opportunity to obtain as many as one-half of the seats in the future parliament.

[Letowski] You have used the word bloc. Therefore, do you expect that steps will be taken to integrate these two groups?

[Maziarski] No, their cooperation will continue to be quite loose, more so than, for example, our cooperation with the ZChN. Hostility and tension persist over there which make it impossible for them to draw too close to each other, despite the fact that no philosophical and program considerations would interfere.

[Letowski] The presidential elections have shown that we need to reckon with the influence of the former PZPR members who have retained informal connections, despite the fact that they are not organized. They still reject the democratic order and democratic rules of the game. The advisers and associates of Tyminski do not identify with either Cimoszewicz or Mazowiecki. Do they still have any chance to recover?

[Maziarski] I believe that they do not because their names are very well known and identified in a manner which is highly unsympathetic to them. Their return

could only be possible in a Bolshevik scenario (disturbances, anarchy setting in in public life). They are certainly betting on this scenario of events.

[Letowski] At present, the key issue involves the future of the Tyminski constituency, or 25 percent of the active voters. In your opinion, who will take over this constituency? European experience indicates that this type of constituency may be taken over by the extreme right just as well as by the extreme left.

[Maziarski] I believe that somebody may come along with a program similar to that of Tyminski, ostensibly apolitical and offering social benefits. However, I do not see this as a serious threat, at least in the next elections. In subsequent elections this may indeed be a problem.

[Letowski] What you have said suggests that forces to the left of the Center have an opportunity to pull one-half of the votes. Let us add to this the 25 percent of the Tyminski constituency which is difficult to define politically at present. Therefore, the Center and the right are left with, at best, 25 percent of the votes and seats in the future parliament. It is not a lot.

[Maziarski] These calculations apply only to a scenario unfavorable for the Center Accord. In that case, they may indeed win about 30 percent of the votes and the seats. However, a scenario more favorable for the Center is also conceivable. In this scenario, one-half of the votes will be gained by the Center Accord, and not more than 20 to 30 percent by the combined left. It will depend on the atmosphere in the country and the effectiveness of the operation of the left, as well as on our mistakes, whether the left will win 30 or 50 percent of the votes.

[Letowski] My impression is that to the left of the Center the situation is clearer than the array of influences in the Center and to the right of the Center. A particularly intense battle for political influence, a sometimes "fratricidal" war will certainly come about there.

[Maziarski] Political battles will be fought on the contact points of the center and the left, and the center and the right. In these areas, politicians whose political outlooks are similar will vie for votes. I am still unable to define the entire spectrum of political forces to the right of the Center. For example, I cannot predict the future of the PSL [Polish Peasant Party]. The election failure of Roman Bartoszcz—this was a failure indeed—may affect the future of this party.

[Letowski] Is the ZChN becoming the strongest party of the Polish right? Its leaders skillfully used the presidential campaign, setting up the Christian Civic Movement and Walesa's election committees which will certainly transform themselves now into the local structures of this party.

[Maziarski] However, their organizational potential is not large enough for them to dream about large gains as soon as this election. While I appreciate the dynamics of this group, I do not expect it to gain a significant number

of seats in the future parliament. Theirs is likely to be a noticeable presence, but not a decisive one. At best they may become the ones who tip the scale.

[Letowski] Can a group of the radical right resembling the German republicans or the French party of Le Pen emerge on the basis of the Tyminski constituency?

[Maziarski] This does not appear possible to me because we do not have the tradition of such groups in Poland. I do not see a leader for a movement of this type; this would have to be someone with a charismatic personality. Likewise, I do not see slogans which are not already being used by others, for example, the ZChN or the KPN [Confederation for an Independent Poland]. Incidentally, the election experience of the KPN indicated that this type of radicalism does not catch on very well under our conditions.

[Letowski] Is there room in this panorama of political groups for the creation of a presidential party which Walesa has not ruled out?

[Maziarski] Lech Walesa is in all probability still hesitating between a concept of parliamentary equilibrium and the less advantageous solution of creating a powerful political base for himself. The first arrangement would give him the role of arbiter, which is advantageous, but it also entails certain risks, because elections may end in a surprise and fail to create two or three parliamentary factions of the same order. As far as the second arrangement is concerned, it may block the development of democracy. As I have said, Walesa is at a crossroads, and he is leaning towards letting these matters run their course. However, at the same time he is aware of the great risk which the fragmentation and anarchization of the Polish political scene would entail. The creation of a presidential party only appears to be a good solution because this party may become as inconvenient at a certain point as the citizens committees did.

[Letowski] However, de Gaulle did create such a party.

[Maziarski] Yes, but his situation was easier because it was clear that democratic institutions in France would be restored. In the case of Poland, this is not certain. In our country, the democratic institutions have not struck roots to such a degree that we could be sure that they will revive and not degenerate into some single-party structure. This is why Walesa's task is much more difficult, and the risk is much greater.

[Letowski] In young democracies, parliamentary elections are more difficult than presidential elections because several hundred politicians with some degree of skill are required for the former, whereas just several individuals suffice for the latter. The quality of our class of politicians is still quite low.

[Maziarski] What we consider a class of politicians in Poland is not really a class of politicians. One and half years ago, at the time of the roundtable, we faced the need to nominate several hundred persons overnight

who could fill the seats of deputies and senators, ministerial positions, and so on. Understandable gaps (after all, we have just come out of the underground) were filled by so-called social authorities—actors, writers, essayists, and directors who have become convinced that they are politicians. However, convictions alone will not be enough. One needs more to be a politician than a nomination to be a politician and a picture with Walesa as a ticket to the Sejm or the Senate. Despite everything, at present this is an easier task because in the past one and one-half years figures have come along whom we know; we know who they are, what views they hold, and what skills they have. Therefore, the situation is easier than it was eighteen months ago when we started almost from scratch, despite the fact that there will be a larger number of seats to be filled and that two sets [of seats] will need to be filled, the ruling one, and the opposition one.

[Letowski] This means that 90 percent of our deputies and senators may be new.

[Maziarski] Certainly, though perhaps not as many as 90 percent. Many deputies and senators in the current term have proven themselves, and I believe that they will be up to a real test of elections. This does not change the fact that this will be a new parliament, and I do not rule out that it will be worse in a way because it will be less experienced.

[Letowski] Thank you for the interview.

YUGOSLAVIA

Zagreb Journal Interviews Chetnik Leader Seselj
91BA0247A Zagreb START in Serbo-Croatian 5 Jan 91
pp 52-56

[Interview with Serbian Chetnik Movement leader Dr. Vojislav Seselj by Mate Basic and Srdjan Spanovic; place and date not given: "Chetnik Duke Who Congratulated Milosevic"—first paragraph is START introduction]

[Text] Dr. Vojislav Seselj, the author of 20 books, five of which are in preparation, eight of which are out of print, and seven of which are banned, was released from prison to participate in the elections as a presidential candidate. The fact that his Serbian Chetnik Movement represents an extreme viewpoint in the Serbian public, because of which his attitude towards Croatia is especially interesting, as well as the fact that the opposition charges that he is Milosevic's mercenary, served as our starting point for this interview.

[START] Despite your escapades with the authorities, which usually end with you going off to prison, there is a belief among the public opposition in Belgrade that you are in fact Milosevic's remote-controlled ruffian of the opposition, installed among their very ranks.

[Seselj] This opinion is not held by the public opposition; rather, these rumors were started by Vuk Draskovic.

They were started by Vuk, his wife Danica, and their closest associates. It is an utterly preposterous allegation and theory, because in that case why would Milosevic arrest his own man and keep him from registering his party.... Presumably we would be most useful to him as a registered party....

[START] Those who make this allegation find support for their theory in the fact that you have regularly broken up opposition gatherings.

[Seselj] But how could Socialist Party gatherings be broken up when they have held neither gatherings nor demonstrations in Belgrade or in the Youth Center, where opposition gatherings have usually been held and where we dispersed the Alliance of Reform Forces of Yugoslavia? When the regime refused to register us, all the opposition parties were silent, except for the Democratic Party and the Serbian Secular Party. These are the only two parties that reacted publicly and in writing on our behalf, and when the Milosevic government refused to register us, no other opposition parties invited us to their gatherings. On three occasions, demonstrations were organized where we were unable to participate in preparations, but we joined in nonetheless and patiently waited for them to finish their prepared speeches and ask us to speak. They did not allow us to speak, and the only thing left for us to do was to storm the speaker's platform through hundreds of Vuk Draskovic's bodyguards. If we had climbed onto the platform and begun to speak, they would have cut off the electricity....

[START] What is the gist of your dispute with Vuk Draskovic?

[Seselj] Vuk Draskovic was the vice president of Serbian National Renewal [SNO] when it was formed on 6 January 1990 in Nova Pazova. I was never a member of that party, but Draskovic was thrown out of it sometime during March. During the period when he was thrown out of the SNO, we had the Serbian Freedom Movement, and we believed that Vuk's expulsion from the SNO was orchestrated by the police in order to destroy Draskovic. We came to his assistance in a way that no one else would, even though our vice president, Milorad Vukosavljevic, and our secretary general, Vojin Vuletic, were against this assistance, alleging that Vuk is a police infiltrator. I was on friendly terms with him for many years—we were even godparents for each other; he christened my son—and I invested all my authority in helping him. The decision to do so was adopted with a majority of votes. We acted out an alliance with Vuk Draskovic, and we publicly announced that Vuk was repudiating the Nova Pazova group and that Serbian National Renewal and the Serbian Freedom Movement were uniting into a new party—the Serbian Renewal Movement. This was our major crime against the Serbian nation and against the public, and we gave him the post of president, even though there was literally no one other than him. Scarcely 15 people met to pretend to be unified with us. Only a few days after that, Vuk Draskovic began to behave in our party in the same way that he

had behaved with the Nova Pazova people, for which reason he was banished. There was truly widespread chaos in the party, he scheduled meetings of the executive committee less frequently than once a month, he put his own people on the executive committee...bringing several people to the meeting and saying that they were members of the executive committee. In this way, he brought Milan Komnenic and several others. But Milan Komnenic is known from earlier days as a police informer who sent writer Gojak Djogu to prison. I left for the United States about 20 days before Draskovic, who subsequently arrived and brought with him Komnenic as his vassal. The party treasurer at the time was Dr. Djordje Nikolic, who was not a reliable person for Draskovic because he was a respectable man and did not lean towards mudslinging. When I left for the United States, Vuk imposed another treasurer, a certain Radmilo Roncevic, a murky figure on the political scene. After arriving in the United States, he told the organizers of the meetings that all the collected money should be sent to Roncevic because the party now had two treasurers, which I myself listened to with alarm, although I could not say anything because I did not have information from home. I thought that perhaps the executive committee in the fatherland had in fact appointed two treasurers. We received \$35,000 there from admission tickets to our lectures and from voluntary contributions, while we got as much as 12,000 German marks [DM] from Germany. All of that money was stolen by Draskovic and Komnenic. Draskovic's wife Danica began to interfere in party affairs as well. She telephoned Secretary General Vojin Vuletic and gave him orders about what to do or inveighed against him if he did not do something according to her wishes. She acted just as tyrannically towards all the members of the Central Fatherland Executive Committee. The pinnacle of all of this was the disruption of a performance of "Saint Sava" at the Yugoslav Dramatic Theater. This performance was disrupted by our young people. While preparations were being made for the action, I was against carrying it out, but Vuk gave his full support to carrying out the disruption. Several hours before the action was to begin, they gave me the text of the play and I read it, after which I gave my support to the plan and participated in the demonstrations in front of the theater. After all of this had transpired, the regime's press leveled its big guns at us, and the most vehement denunciation came from the ideological originator and organizer of the action, Vuk Draskovic, who compared us to Khamenei supporters, with the Ustashi.... He did so at a press conference in France, and I immediately responded that he had no right to release statements in the name of the party, especially since he played an important role in all of it. He refrained from arguing with me, saying that we would discuss everything at a party meeting, only to repeat all these charges the next day on Radio Belgrade. This was the reason for the meeting of the Central Fatherland Executive Committee at which Vuk Draskovic was relieved of the presidency. At the time, the Central Fatherland Executive Committee had 31 members; the meeting was attended by 19 members, and under the

party bylaws decisions are reached by a majority of votes. Vuk later alleged that we do not have any bylaws, even though I personally wrote the bylaws that were adopted and that formed the basis for our work. Before the beginning of the voting, two members—out of the 19 present—left the meeting because of travel commitments and family matters. During the voting, there were 17 members present. There were 10 votes in favor of removing Vuk Draskovic and five opposed, with three abstentions. This means 10 against eight—a narrow majority, but still a majority. Procedure was respected, and democracy means procedure above all else. That day, at one hour past midnight, Vuk Draskovic left for the editorial offices of POLITIKA, NOVOSTI, and BORBA and gave them an untrue announcement to the effect that the attempt to dismiss him had failed, and in that announcement he declared me to be a madman, a psychiatric case, and he denounced me in the worst way possible. They received him at 0100 in the editorial offices of POLITIKA, where I have never even made it past the registration office in broad daylight, and from the printing press they pulled an article that had already been written in order to insert his untrue announcement. The next day, when we went to take them a denial, they refused to receive us or to publish the denial. Only VECERNJE NOVOSTI published the denial. This was around 6 June.... After several days, Vuk scheduled a meeting of his supporters, attended by a minority of members of the Central Fatherland Executive Committee, and to which he invited those chairmen of local committees outside Belgrade whose support he knew he could count on. There, he held what was in fact the founding meeting of a new party, which he called the Serbian Renewal Movement, and instantly there were two parties with the same name. The Milosevic regime's press gave him a great deal of publicity and always accepted his variant, while snubbing us. No one was willing to publish our version. Because with Draskovic's departure from the party, everyone compromise-oriented, compromised in the past, infected by toadyism, also left...people like Milan Komnenic, Bogoljub Pejcic, Ilija Zivkovic. Since we no longer had any reason to hide our true ideological orientation and political convictions, and since we did not consider it necessary to expend any effort on arguing with Draskovic about who was the true Serbian Renewal Movement, we decided to change the party's name, whereby we became the Serbian Chetnik Movement. Since then, Vuk, with the regime's information media, has incessantly waged a campaign against us, and our registration was rejected with the explanation that with our Chetnik name we are an affront to public morals. He has publicly espoused the idea that we should even be banned, since the Secretariat for Justice and Administration is not in charge of our registration; rather, Veljko Kadjevic is responsible for us.... While I was in prison, Draskovic spread rumors throughout the United States, Australia, and Canada to the effect that I was not in prison, but rather in an insane asylum. We quickly realized that Vuk is the one who has been planted in the Serbian opposition by the regime and the police. The catastrophic

electoral defeat of the Serbian opposition must be linked to him. Everyone who has had political business with him has met with ruin. Why has Vuk Draskovic been promoted by the regime as the top opposition leader? Because the regime has had him in its pocket since as early as 1968. His police file is brimming over because he was cooperating with the police even then. He could not have been a TANJUG correspondent in Zambia and Mika Spiljak's press secretary, he would not have worked for RAD and enjoyed all the privileges of the regime if he were not a confidant of the regime and police. He is a man known as a journalist-police liquidator, who denounced Lazar Stojanovic, the director of "Plastic Jesus," who went to prison because of it, as well as Dr. Jovan Zubovic, Jelka Imsirovic, Pavlusko Imsirovic, and Milan Nikolic, who were punished by communist courts.... Vuk Draskovic denounced them in the most vehement manner in the regime's information media. The police knew about all of this, and they also knew that Vuk is an unstable person, that he is a big coward. When we had the first major anticommunist demonstrations in Belgrade on 31 January 1990, he did not dare show up. He watched what was happening from the fourth floor of the "Albania" palace, in the International Press Center, afraid to come down, even though the crowd was calling his name. They knew he was this type, and that is why he was the most suitable person and they called on him. They knew about this to such an extent that they sent Belgrade Television to the founding meeting of his then-party, SNO, as well as a large number of journalists, and gave him a great deal of publicity. They needed him then, because this was the time of the failed party congress, and they wanted at any price to create among the public the impression of a counterbalance to the nationalistic forces in Slovenia, Croatia, and Serbia. They had to create a Serbian counterpart to Tudjman and Rupel in order that communist unity on the federal level be based on opposition to all these enemies.

[START] In your opinion, was this a game by the Serbian republican leadership or a game on the federal level?

[Seselj] It was a Serbian, republican game. Afterwards, they no longer needed Vuk, and then he became very frightened. He was in a terrible panic, he quarreled with his wife in front of journalists, and then Miroslav Solevic informed him that Milosevic would not be arresting him.... Solevic was personally present at the talks with Milosevic. As soon as he heard that he would not be arrested, Draskovic perked up and continued with his political activities. The circumstances surrounding his expulsion from SNO are still unclear, and we do not know what is behind it; however, it is a fact that he was intolerable as a leader of the party. After breaking up with Draskovic, we Chetniks got our activities going in full swing, and one of the most successful of them was the commemoration of the anniversary of the death of Gen. Draza Mihailovic. We brought together around 10,000 people for that. If we had been registered at the beginning of August, we would clearly be the most

important opposition party in Serbia. By rejecting our registration, they denied us public promotion and appearances; we have always met with police cordons, people write and fabricate the most heinous stories about us, cheat us.... All this time, the regime's media have helped resurrect Vuk's party, which has practically ceased to exist this year.

[START] However, your party is linked to the "Black Hand" organization which has terrorized innocent citizens, threatened them, and even beat up on them. This clearly does not fall within the framework of activities by a party with a democratic program.

[Seselj] "Black Hand" is also part of the Serbian police. They found several people within our party, as well as some who have no links with us, as well as one whom we expelled for lack of discipline—and formed this organization. In all, "Black Hand" brought together 10 or 15 psychopaths who on Knez-Mihajlova Ulica in Belgrade began, quite actively, to threaten people, foment dissension, pick fights, and act without restraint. They beat up some beggar because he was Muslim, they turned over some Albanian's street stove for cooking corn on the cob, they attacked one person from behind, punched him in the eye and injured him, they began keeping lists for liquidation and using these lists to threaten.... They have told me openly that I am at the top of the list, and they have circulated lies to the effect that I have been replaced as head of the Serbian Chetnik Movement, which they even published in the newspaper one day. There was not even a meeting held, much less discussion of the matter, but they drew up an untrue announcement and sent it out through the media. None of this would be possible if they did not have tacit police support and if they did not receive instructions from the police. How else would behavior threatening people on a daily basis be possible without police intervention?! And all summer it was impossible to sit around and be certain that they would not arrive uninvited and throw you out, attack you, injure you, beat you up.... They include one person who says that he is an emigrant from Australia, but who has skillfully led the activities of "Black Hand." So skillfully that it was obvious that this is a fake emigrant who is working for the police.

One Saturday, they came to me and said that I would be liquidated on Monday. I got up and gathered a group of young Chetniks, with whom I went to the dormitory where two of the main bullies lived. I told the young Chetniks to take them outside some cafe, and I beat the two of them black and blue....

[START] You beat them up with a baseball bat?!

[Seselj] Exactly.... The two of them were treated at Zemun Hospital for serious physical injuries.

[START] How did the police react to this, given the fact that you committed a criminal act?

[Seselj] They came to me and took me away for interrogation, during which I admitted everything. However,

the victims later asserted that it wasn't me who beat them up, but rather someone else. No one pressed criminal charges against me, because they are afraid of a public trial. When they pursue me wrongfully, the public is excluded. They bring me before the court, it hands down a sentence, and that's that. However, when it is a criminal act, they cannot avoid having a full court, journalists, the public....

[START] How old were the young people who were beaten up, and were they your physical equals as adversaries?

[Seselj] They were between 20 and 30 years old, one of them was taller than me (Seselj is about two meters tall and weighs more than 100 kg—Editor's note), while the other one was somewhat shorter, but was not physically diminutive....

[START] You mean that the situation was such that there was the possibility of fair fight....

[Seselj] Listen, how much of a fair fight can you ask for when they had threatened to kill me! I didn't set out to fight them, I set out to beat them black and blue! You can fight with someone who is your equal by challenging them to a chivalrous dual, but I had no one to compete with on equal footing, so I decided to beat them up. In this way, it acted as an example for all the others. Afterwards, they made other threats through the press, saying that they will use guns, that they will organize a fireworks display for me, but after the beating they were not as vocal, nor did they show their faces. After the beating that I gave them, life became calmer along Knez-Mihajlova Ulica....

[START] It has been said, and it was written in the newspapers at the time of the elections, that the Serbian police is planning to assassinate Vuk Draskovic, and among Vuk's circles you have been mentioned as a potential organizer of the assassination. To what extent is all this simply a preelection propaganda trick, and obviously an unsuccessful one?

[Seselj] First, Vuk and the regime's press accused me of planning to assassinate Vuk. When there were demonstrations in June of last year, and when we broke through the cordon of Vuk's bodyguards in order to speak, the television showed a picture of some people attacking Vuk Draskovic, and we were accused of attacking him. No one attacked him; rather, his pack of bodyguards themselves caused the panic. Someone shouted, "Look out for the pistol!" and everyone began to draw in around Vuk, while Vuk the coward, like God made him, was frightened and the television showed his panic-stricken face.... Lately, everyone has once again been talking about how someone is planning to assassinate Vuk; these are simply new fabrications. There is no one planning to assassinate Vuk, because no one is interested in doing so. Thus far, he has suited the regime as the ideal political adversary, as these elections have also shown. He is a political charlatan, a status seeker, a moral nonentity, and they could not have invented a

better adversary. Can you imagine Vuk Draskovic in the post of president of the Republic of Serbia? I don't think anyone in the Serbian nation can seriously imagine him in that post.... Why would Tudjman plan to assassinate him; since Vuk resolutely went to him in Jasenovac to make up for the past, after first preventing Radovan Karadzic and Brane Crncean from laying the wreath at Jasenovac? Then, Vuk appeared and Tudjman abandoned him.... Why would the Albanians kill Vuk when he has proposed negotiations with Rugova, which the communist regime does not want to do?

[START] You were the first and only of the opposition to congratulate Slobodan Milosevic on his election victory. Why?

[Seselj] Words of congratulations are first and foremost an act of civility. When I agreed to be a candidate in the presidential elections as a challenger to Milosevic, who won, the elementary civil order dictated that I congratulate him. That victory was an honest one. He did not win because he is politically strong, but rather because he did not have a single serious challenger. The regime itself created such conditions on the electoral scene by drastically lowering the criteria for founding parties and the criteria for running for president of the Republic. All that was necessary was to collect a hundred signatures for the presidential candidacy, and the same to found a party. The result: 55 parties, 32 candidates for president.... In this way, the regime toyed with the opposition, disabled it. Finally, as far as the congratulations message goes, I took advantage of that opportunity to renew our demand for the registration of the Serbian Chetnik Movement. Milosevic was also congratulated by Tudjman as well as Veljko Kadijevic and a number of people who are known not to like him. It's a matter of culture.

[START] Do you think it is accurate to say that one of the reasons for the socialists' victory in Serbia, as a basic continuation of Bolshevization, is the fact that the Bolshevik regime succeeded in achieving a propitious union with the Orthodox Church through skillful manipulation, with the religious feelings of the citizens, and with tradition, in this way capturing a majority of votes?

[Seselj] I do not think that that theory is justified, and I do not believe that it is possible to Bolshevize Serbia. Serbia, and especially Belgrade, had strong opposition to Bolshevism during a time when no one else in Yugoslavia had any. People in Serbia began to think for themselves a long time ago, and no one can stereotype their convictions any longer. Throughout Yugoslavia, communists themselves have begun chipping away at communist structures, particularly in the economic realm, and in order for a communist regime to revive itself, it first has to revive the economy according to communist principles, which is impossible. In political practice, the current government in Serbia has always applied some Bolshevik methods, such as arrests, outlawing parties, media control—and that is what partially vindicates the people who support the theory that you mentioned. However, that theory ignores many other

more important factors, the most important of which is absolute control over the economy. Relapses of Bolshevism are also what the government is doing to our party. When we were denied registration, the summonses by the police began, and the person who rented us the premises for our party headquarters was also present at the meeting. Afterwards, we were given notice to vacate even though we had paid fair and square.... Right now, the informal party headquarters is this cafe in which we are sitting—and from it we will descend and capture power in Serbia. This cafe was called "Zagreb," and one day we took down the sign reading "Zagreb Restaurant," wrote out the old name, "The Russian Czar," on a piece of paper, and stuck it up in the window. We forbade the management of the restaurant to change the name and return the sign with "Zagreb" on it, and as you can see no one can conceive of putting the sign back. We would take it down immediately....

[START] Don't these methods seem heavy-handed to you?

[Seselj] No, the communists have been heavy-handed, and we have simply returned everything to how it was before, because before the war the cafe was called "The Russian Czar." If someone takes something away from you and you take it back, it's not you who is being heavy-handed, but rather the person who took it away from you. If the legal system does not allow you to take back stolen property, then you have the right to help yourself. This is one of the old institutions of law recognized by all civil systems.

[START] What is the basic attitude of the Serbian Chetnik Movement to the use of force? The Croatian Nation-Building Movement, an organization in Croatia that can be compared to yours, espouses the idea that the use of force should not be excluded in achieving an independent Croatian state.

[Seselj] We rule out the use of force, because force is not necessary. We know that we will achieve an independent, free Serbian state that will include all the Serbian lands, and there is no one in sight who could counteract this.

[START] What do you include among Serbian lands?

[Seselj] I think that the entire public already knows that. Without going into details, it will suffice for you if I say that the borders of Serbia must encompass Serbian Dubrovnik, Serbian Dalmatia, Serbian Like, Serbian Banija, Serbian Kordun, Serbian Slavonia, Serbian Baranja.... That's on the western side. We think that force will not be necessary in order to establish this type of Serbian state, and that is why the Serbian Chetnik Movement was formed as a party with an explicitly democratic character in terms of its party structure, its decisionmaking process, and its method of activity. We were artificially outlawed....

[START] But the party has a military name....

[Seselj] It's not a military name! Admittedly, the Chetniks were originally guerrillas, it was a guerrilla organization. During the time of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, they were a superparty organization, and during World War II the Chetniks became the organization of the Yugoslav Royal Army in the fatherland, even though essential changes occurred after World War II. The communist regime made a lot of noise about the concept of "Chetnik ideology," and it considered this to include everything in the Serbian nation that was anticommunist, oriented towards capitalism, multiparty.... For several decades, the communists lumped all of this together under the concept of Chetnikism. We all know that concepts change throughout history, and under today's historical circumstances it would be preposterous for a Chetnik movement to form as a guerrilla or military organization. Under the changed historical circumstances, we concluded that it is better to form as a democratic political party. But our political goals are identical to the goals of the Chetnik movement during the time of the struggle against the Turks, from the time of the Balkan wars, of World War II.... That which is attributed to us as tyranny and terrorism is the product of the regime's Belgrade press. Each incident that occurs is attributed to the Chetniks, they send provocateurs to us to incite violence.

[START] You maintain that you intend in some way to apply democratic methods in order to create a Serbia with the boundaries that you have mentioned, but since this is obviously unreasonable, you are probably counting on force in the second phase, and you will have to count on the fact that the Croats—we personally, for example, so that we are not speaking on anyone else's behalf—could resist you with force....

[Seselj] If you resist us with force, then you will also be destroyed by force.... You must understand that the Croats are not a historical nation, and that they are not capable of waging war, nor have they waged war in 900 years. Perhaps some would be offended by this, but these are facts. You must bear in mind that the Croats are the only nation in the world that around 150 years ago renounced its own language and adopted someone else's standard language as its own. The Croats originally spoke the Kajkavian and Chakavian dialects of Serbo-Croatian. Kajkavian is much more similar to the Slovene language than to Serbian, and during the Illyrian Movement, under the influence of the Catholic Church, the Croats adopted it as their standard language. You must know that that which is today regarded as the Croatian national corpus comprises at least—and perhaps even more than—one-third Serbs. Today, all Serbs who have converted to Catholicism are regarded as Croats. Even part of my family has converted to Catholicism, and there is a certain writer living in Zagreb, Stjepan Seselj, who once disassociated himself from me in the pages of VJESNIK.

[START] But perhaps your part of the family was Serbianized.

[Seselj] That is his theory, and it is incorrect. I have proof of my theory. Around 200 years ago, there were three brothers living in the village of Ridjana, near Niksic in Montenegro—Petar, Nikola, and Risto. One of them married and they had to get rid of the young bey in order to enjoy the right to a proper honeymoon. Instead of sending the young man away, the three of them went out, killed the bey and five of the bey's brothers, and set fire to his belvedere. Afterwards, they fled to Herzegovina, to Popovo Polje, where they first settled in the village of Kotezi. Then, Nikola, who is my ancestor, moved to Mareva Ljut, near Zavala in Popovo Polje, married some girl there, and inherited her land. Risto remained in Kotezi, while Petar went to Opuzen, where he or his descendants accepted Catholicism. And they are still called Petkovic, except that their last name is Seselj, and they have retained St. Luke as the family patron.

[START] Some Serbian historians have an opinion contrary to your theory about the Croats. They describe the Croats as an unmistakably warlike and bloodthirsty nation.

[Seselj] It is one thing to be a warlike nation and another thing to be bloodthirsty. I don't recall them ever calling the Croats a warlike nation. And where are these wars that the Croats have waged? Since the defeat at Gvozde in 1097, the Croats as a nation have not waged a single war. Afterwards, having lost their state, they participated in some wars, but as mercenaries.

[START] And in this sense they were similar to the Serbs, who also took part in wars as mercenaries.

[Seselj] But the Serbs, unlike the Croats, succeeded with their own forces in reestablishing their state, after which they were in a position to wage war independently. Some of the Vojvodina Serbs continued to serve in foreign armies, especially the Serbs from the Military Border.... This is probably where the roots of Serbo-Croatian animosity came from, since these Serbs, as soldiers, enjoyed a privileged position in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The Military Border never knew serfdom, and the Croats regarded this with envy. Many of these Serbs were converted to Catholicism, and some of them were the most vehement Ustashi during World War II.... I agree with those who maintain that Slovenes are essentially Alpine Croats. Such a similarity between Kajkavian and the Slovene language is not coincidental. I am no linguist, but this is obvious. Anyway, who are the Slovenes if they are not Croats? They have never had their own national identity, they have never had their own state....

[START] Aren't you losing sight of the fact that aside from numerous defeats that are mostly solemnized in Serbia, the victories won by the Serbs were achieved with a great deal of assistance from the "motherland," Russia, just as the Croats had this type of "assistance," if we leave aside borders, from Austria-Hungary?

[Seselj] That's not true. The Croats were part of Austria-Hungary, while the Russians helped us as an Orthodox nation. It is obvious that they had their international political and economic interests as a reason for doing so. The Croats were not helped by Austria-Hungary; rather, they were incorporated as part of the state, while the Serbs succeeded in preserving their state even without the help of Russia. Part of Montenegro was never conquered by the Turks. There was always a territory, regardless of how small, that was preserved as an independent state and as a defender of the Serbian nation-building tradition. From that small territory, the liberation of almost all of the Serbian nation was achieved.

[START] The new Constitution of the Republic of Croatia was recently proclaimed, while the Serbs around Knin proclaimed their "autonomy." What is your assessment of these two acts?

[Seselj] I regard this as part of the political prelude to the definitive dismemberment of Yugoslavia. That which is called the Constitution today is not a constitution in the true sense of the word. It is a constitution to the extent that what preceded it was also a constitution. The 1974 Constitution is an octroyed constitution. In order to adopt a Croatian constitution, there must first exist a Croatian state. There is no Croatian state in existence today. Perhaps it will exist some day, I don't know, but it does not exist today. I am not talking about the content of the Constitution, because I have not read it, but am speaking only in principle.

[START] When you say that, are you thinking only about the Croatian Constitution, or does that apply to the Serbian Constitution as well?

[Seselj] It applies to the Serbian Constitution as well, naturally. We Chetniks do not recognize what the communists in Serbia call the Constitution. We believe that a constitution can be adopted only in a constitutionally proper manner, meaning by convening a constitutional convention on the basis of universal suffrage, the participation of all parties, and a proportional electoral system.

[START] Do you share the view put forward on Belgrade Television after the declaration of the Croatian Constitution to the effect that this is the Constitution of the Independent State of Croatia?

[Seselj] I agree that Franjo Tudjman is the new Ustashi leader, but whether the new Ustashi state will achieve independence remains to be seen....

[START] In Serbia, the odium that has existed over the past 40 years has been removed from the word "Chetnik." Since you so flippantly declare the president of the Republic of Croatia to be an Ustashi leader, do you think that the very same process has occurred in Croatia with the concept of "Ustashi," and that a reassessment of the Ustashi movement and state has been carried out?

[Seselj] That odium surrounding the Chetnik name was artificially imposed, while I think that among the Croatian nation the Ustashi ideal has never had a negative overtone. The Croats identified with the Ustashi ideology all the way up to the end of 1943, with the capitulation of Italy. There was no outspoken opposition to the Ustashi ideology in Croatia even after the war. The communist regime in Croatia opposed it only to the extent that it had to on the basis of orders coming from Belgrade. There is not one single writer in Croatia who has dealt with the Ustashi ideology in his works.

[START] That's not true....

[Seselj] Who, then?

[START] We can mention just a few names as examples: Jozza Horvat, Vjekoslav Kaleb, Ivan Donecovic....

[Seselj] I have rarely met Croats who were willing to distance themselves from the Ustashi ideology. When they are told to their face that they are Ustashis because of their ideological positions, political pensions, and the like, many are ready to take offense and fight over the issue, if they feel that they have been told this in a pejorative sense. But I believe that Ante Pavelic is one of the great sons of the Croatian nation, like Josip Broz, and that he expresses the Croatian national aspirations. What these Croatian national aspirations are and how they are reflected in Serbo-Croatian relations is a different question. We Serbs have been made the scapegoat for this, which is why genocide was perpetrated against us. Serbs and Croats will never be able to live within the borders of a unified state provided that said state is democratic. We are two nations living in serious conflict, and that conflict can be resolved only through fixing our own boundaries. It remains to be seen whose interests will prevail in this sense....

[START] Do you not in fact see a clear disassociation from the NDH [Independent State of Croatia] in Dr. Franjo Tudjman's statement to the effect that that state emerged as an expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian nation, but that having witnessed the character of that state it was precisely the Croatian nation that withheld support from the Ustashis and turned against the fascist movement? Perhaps you are unaware of the fact that Croatia bases its antifascist continuity on the decisions by ZAVNOH [Antifascist Council of People's Liberation of Croatia]? And during his stay in Canada, Dr. Tudjman reacted sharply to Pavelic's picture on the wall of the auditorium in which he was to speak.

[Seselj] That was such a bland disassociation, expressed only for the sake of appearances so that Tudjman would have a line of retreat before the federal state, before the army, before the international public. I think that he is insincere about this.

[START] You regard the Chetnik movement in World War II as the embodiment of patriotism and impeccability?

[Seselj] Not even they were impeccable. No one can be impeccable during a civil war. When someone kills someone else, you simply have to ask both how many they killed and why they killed. The Ustashis killed a million Serbs. According to Vladimir Dedijer's figures, the communists killed between 100,000 and 150,000 people, while according to the testimony of Josa Tomasevic, an American historian of Croatian origin who is not at all well disposed towards the Serbs, the Chetniks, in contrast, killed up to 10,000 people during World War II. I read that in a book that was published in Zagreb, as I recall. I am not out to gloss over any misdeeds here. Wherever Chetniks committed misdeeds, individually or in groups, that must be stated. As far as I know, the Chetniks committed mass murder only in one isolated case. This was in the Foca area, when they killed 1,500 Muslims....

[START] Wasn't it 30,000 people?

[Seselj] Where do you get 30,000? There have never been 30,000 of them living there. There are records about this, a letter from Duke Pavel Djurisic to Gen. Draza Mihailovic in which he writes about the concrete reason for this slaughter. The Muslims in that town were mistreating and killing Serbs, and this was a pure act of retaliation. The direct reason was the fact that Muslims had cut the throat of a Serbian child, boiled him, and sent him to Duke Djurisic with the message, "Bojurum, Duke!" [Duke, help yourself!] The Chetniks then killed Muslims only from those towns from which those who had killed Serbs came. Other Muslim towns were left untouched. And that is one isolated case. Tell me another case where Chetniks engaged in mass murder.

[START] In Gati, next to Omis....

[Seselj] Only a hundred people were killed. Chetnik Mane Rokvic was killed because of that.

[START] But even one was too many....

[Seselj] Mane Rokvic was punished for that, killed.... The Chetnik court of the Dinarics sentenced him to death.

[START] Why don't we return to some of the questions that have remained unanswered. You have said that you do not recognize the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. How do you regard the Knin move to proclaim autonomy?

[Seselj] We support that move and believe that it is a good, but temporary measure. These are preparations, both from one side and from the other, for the ultimate separation that is coming for us in Yugoslavia.

[START] How do you view the prospects of the nation in Yugoslavia?

[Seselj] We hope that there are no prospects whatsoever for the preservation of Yugoslavia as a state. We believe that it is of no use to anyone living in Yugoslavia,

because it will never be a democratic state. It is impossible for Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes to live together in a common state, as history shows us. Yugoslavia was constituted as a democratic state. The Vidovdan Constitution was an unmistakably democratic constitution, one of the most liberal constitutions in the world at the time, but it was impossible for such a Yugoslavia to survive. I think that it is clear to every reasonable person who thinks about Yugoslavia that there is no sense to its existence.

[START] How do you interpret the fact that the military top brass in Yugoslavia consists primarily of Serbian generals?

[Seselj] The military is a major danger that threatens everyone. It has incompetent generals, hard-line communists who got their stars based on the principle of negative selection, especially in the case of the Serbian generals. Not one honest Serbian officer has been able to become a general, precisely because he is honest. The worst traitors of the Serbian nation have become generals, people who are most of all willing to renounce their own national interests and unquestioningly carry out the orders of the communist regime. This is a major danger, because these officers that God provided are incapable of any kind of warfare, and they are not even aware of their own incapability. They are convinced that they are a beneficial factor in Yugoslavia, that they are predestined to save it, that they are commanded by God to lead the country's economy.... We are glad that they have formed their communist party of generals, because in this way they are making a list of themselves that will one day be used as a basis for sentencing by popular courts.

Croatian Minister Boljkovac's Incident Discussed

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[Article by Jasna Babic: "Who Trained Arkan?"]

[Text] A few days ago, the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, although it is not exactly a favorite institution in Croatia, whispered to the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP] in a friendly manner that preparations were being made in Belgrade for the forcible liberation of Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, who is currently the best known prisoner of the Zagreb district court. As is well known, he was recently arrested in Dvor na Uni, with an entire arsenal of choice weapons. According to reports from federal informants, the anonymous liberators are planning to kidnap a member of the family of one of the highest representatives of the Croatian state, and then trade him for the mysterious prisoner. Either by coincidence or as part of the same plan, several days later Croatian special forces escorting Minister Boljkovac, who was once again "roaming" the area, stopped a car with unusual passengers. Dressed in ordinary civilian clothing but with the identification of military officers, using civilian license plates but with JNA [Yugoslav People's Army] plates in the trunk,

neither they nor the military authorities wanted to explain what role they were playing by circling around a high-level official of the Republic of Croatia....

The "Arkan case," which is growing more and more into a new Croatian-Serbian, but also Serbian-Serbian scandal, thus gained further seriousness, and, if you wish, ticklishness. What has been known to date, and even more what is being revealed now about that Belgrade criminal, an agent of the State Security Service [SDB] and the head of [Crvena] Zvezda's [Red Star soccer team] "Heroes," which can also be considered a political function, is thus an exciting and terrible story that is exposing a world, a lifestyle, and political methods that have rarely shown their faces.

Little Parties on Tolstojeva

At the beginning of the 1980's, the institution of the "little party," intimate household gatherings, was spreading across Belgrade. This fashion apparently came from Dedinje, a stronghold of the "red bourgeoisie," as people said in 1968. The first ones to experience foreign countries and "corrupt capitalism," who created trends, and even the first drug parties—the sons and daughters of national heroes, politicians, and generals—while entertaining themselves created very close ties with the Yugoslav underground, which, in the abruptly urbanized capital, was also the first in all the republic metropolises to assume the organized form of a mafia, with serious assistance from political circles.

Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, the son of a high-level Montenegrin Air Force officer, naturally belongs to that same Dedinje class. Furthermore, his very select society gathered at little parties at 7 Tolstojeva, in the villa of General Jovan Popovic, the father of Arkan's best friend Misko. Today, Popovic Junior is the owner of a small printing enterprise located at the same address, but then he was well known as a rather questionable child of an authoritarian father of guaranteed moral and political reliability. Some citizens of Belgrade remember very well how he crippled one of his fellow citizens for life by shooting him in both knees....

Naturally, we do not know how much this friendship contributed to Arkan's becoming an employee of the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs, or more precisely, the Federal SDS: [State Security Service] whether he got the job thanks to General Popovic, the founder of the police's Security Institute, an institution for the transfer of "special" people, weapons, equipment, and skills, or even actually through direct ties with Stane Dolanc, the "commander" for many years of Yugoslavia's police troops, as they are interpreted today. Perhaps he even got the job through his own "merits." It is more than certain, however, that Arkan is neither an ordinary criminal, nor a quite typical employee of the secret institutions of the Yugoslav state. Undoubtedly a person with above-average intelligence, charming, with the image of a typical Belgrade "idler," an adventurer for whom ordinary jobs and Yugoslavia itself were too

confining, he became, in many respects, a bridge between Yugoslav political representation and its by no means lovely, suppressed opposite face. To that extent he was a person who could make a considerable impression on the spoiled children of generals, who soon became bored at their little parties. Even in the 1980's, when he found himself among those childhood friends again after an absence of many years, he had the background of a "man of the world" for whom warrants had been issued in several European countries. He would only disappear again from time to time—at least, as he told amazed friends—traveling in the private airplane of an anonymous official on certain "strictly confidential" assignments, undoubtedly enjoying the mystery woven around him. For example: he never confirmed or denied, by a single word, the story of the liquidation of Stjepan Djurekovic in 1983, which spread throughout Yugoslavia and even all emigre organizations in the world. However, the way in which the Croatian political fugitive was killed—his face, already dead and drilled by bullets, was crushed by an ax—did not correspond at all to the signature of a cold-blooded gentleman killer...unless the purpose was to hinder or even completely prevent identification of the victim.

The fact that Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan owned identification from the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs was only revealed with certainty in 1986, when the hero of our story was brought to trial for the first time in his career of intrigue. The documents of the prosecution, which accused him of inflicting serious bodily harm upon a certain officer he came upon in the elevator of a building on Ivo Lola Ribar Street in Belgrade, according to VREME, clearly state his occupation as "a SSUP [Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs] employee," since official identification, properly signed and stamped by the proper authorities, was actually found among his effects. During the discussion, however, the SSUP denied this, claiming that the defendant was not in any of its records. That fact, of course, could also mean that there were mutually exclusive forces and interests within the institution responsible for protecting what was then still the socialist constitutional order.

Conflict of the "Generals' Houses"

Nevertheless, with the image of a "secret agent" for whom everything really is permitted, Arkan has become a legend once and for all: By reputation and fame, he has succeeded Ljubo Magas Zemunac, the head of the Yugoslav mafia in Frankfurt and one of the leaders of the royalist Ravna Gora, who was liquidated in that same year, 1986. A bronze monument—a statue of the dead man wearing enormous boxing gloves—was erected in Belgrade's New Cemetery in Zemunac's honor. In the opinion of some of the capital's local gossip, that mafia member was also in love with his homeland, Yugoslavia, which he put in his debt through some secret services. As proof, people cite the fact that for years he crossed the Yugoslav border without hindrance from anyone, which must mean that the domestic authorities protected him from prosecution by foreign police. Thus some people

think that Arkan and Zemunac, because of identical services to the state and the people, are perceived as equal heroes, although the assassin from Dedinje and the fallen boxer from Zvezdara belong to completely different worlds.

In any case, a year before Arkan's trial, which in comparison with some of his previous acts began with an almost innocent incident—in 1983 he shot at two policemen without any warrant being issued because of it—an equally interesting and tragic incident occurred in Belgrade. It seems that this was the first symptom of the latent war taking place among unidentified state bodies, one might say "generals' houses," and undoubtedly among various political "schools," using all available means in settling accounts among themselves. In February 1985 a certain Ratko Rubezic, a pimp, dealer, and blackmailer, who had also returned from abroad, was killed near the Belgrade Gate skyscraper. Five of his acquaintances and friends fired eight bullets into him, and two of Rubezic's drivers were identified among the attackers. As was revealed somewhat later in the investigation and the court proceedings, they had been in regular contact with the Belgrade Secretariat of Internal Affairs, and had informed it of the movements of their employer. Among other things, the police were informed that Rubezic was thinking about the deed of his life, the kidnapping of a general's son (is there any identity with the plans and style of Arkan's present liberators, if such people exist?). Admittedly, a warrant had been issued for Rubezic, but the police had allegedly not been able to catch him at all, because he escaped all their ambushes and assaults. In contrast to this, however, one of the court witnesses claimed that at precisely that time, Rubezic was associating cordially with the Belgrade SUP [Secretariat of Internal Affairs] members in the city's taverns. The danger of kidnapping and blackmail was thus removed only when Rubezic was liquidated, and so Belgrade gossip, as a rule well informed, linked all these facts and attributed the organization of Rubezic's murder to Arkan. They say that the legendary adventurer condescended to accept such an undignified job because the unsentenced victim of the kidnapping would have been Misko, the son of General Jovo Popovic, Arkan's best friend, and a person with whom certain specific interests are still associated. The Dedinje youth of the 1980's needed a lot of money and excitement....

Man From Red Square

In short, Arkan was in many ways undoubtedly classified with a quite specific clan, with quite specific people, and a person. And that person, Jovan Popovic, necessarily made enemies of certain people long before he took control of such an important institution as the Partizan soccer club, the special financial, political, and even ideological creation of the wartime victors. The general, in fact, as a world-famous expert on explosives, wrecked several very significant projects of the Yugoslav "political police." The first time was in the mid-1970's—the "Hrkac case"—and the second time was somewhat later, the Zagreb "Paromilinska case." The SDB thus had truly

terrible terrorist crimes on its hands, but because of Popovic's expertise had to utilize contrived schemes at the trials, as can still be recognized today in the court explanations. As we know, the not very "clever" person from Listic "confessed" to bombing Belgrade's 20 October movie theater, where many people were hurt, and described the bombs, and the means of activating them; and then Popovic, smiling in his police colleagues' faces, denied the credibility of Hrkac's statements. Finally, when the trial was resumed for the third time, Popovic was expelled from the courtroom for formal reasons, and his expert testimony was invalidated by the fact that he had spoken with the defendant without authorization. In a similar way, as one of three pyrotechnical experts, Popovic later called into question the Zagreb police, the prosecution, and the judicial system at the big "bomb trial" of a group of people accused of mining the Credit Bank just before one of Tito's visits. One of them, Djuro Perica, is today the head of the assembly commission for oversight of the Croatian SDS. He was finally sentenced to 14 years in prison, not for the act he was initially indicted for, but instead for "association for the purpose of hostile activity," since the experts, i.e., Popovic, had demonstrated that the terrorist label was untenable. Even at that time, from all indications, the power of that general exceeded his publicly known and recognized position. In the uproar of a conflict among the high military ranks assembled in the administration of Partizan, a journalist from Belgrade's NOVOSTI 8 would later try to solve the mystery of his influence, describing him as, among other things, a man on the central reviewing stand at a Moscow parade back in Stalin's day. Admittedly, instead of his full name, the article's author only used the initials J.P., but he also included quite specific biographical information that indicated very clearly that the person in question was actually the "Russian student" whose involvement with the Partizan soccer club served as a cover for financial transactions associated with the Institute for Security. And really, when we asked several experts on the army and the police what that institution was like and what its purpose and substance were, we received the same contradictory answers. Among other things, we were told that it had trained many Arab "special troops," that it could be one of the important arguments in Loncar's peace mission to the Gulf on the brink of war....

Well, that is the kind of milieu to which belongs the mystical and mysterious person who was arrested at the end of last year in Dvor na Uni, with an arsenal in which journalist Milos Vasic, in the newspaper VREME, recognized specimens of automatic weapons and bombs that cannot even be found in the civilian market. In this regard, it is an interesting fact that the "goods" were captured not upon his departure for Knin, as would have been logical if he had left to help the rebels in Knin, but rather, on the contrary, upon his return from the Knin region, as if his expensive and dangerous cargo were actually destined for Belgrade.

For some new "rebels," for someone's private collection, or even actually for himself, as Arkan's attorney states.

how is this an ordinary quantity of defensive weapons? Perhaps Tijanic's already generally accepted theory that Arkan was actually "handed over" to the Croatian police with all of that incriminating materiel is correct. This was perhaps because he really did already have to climb over some people's heads, but also partly so that he would finally speak out. His removal from the Belgrade mafia/police scene could even have been done much more simply, but in this way Arkan is a very dangerous witness about various murky affairs of part of the Dedinje aristocracy. It seems that it is not only in the Croatian police's interest to find out what Arkan was seeking in Knin, for whom, and what the general purpose of all his missions was, even the most obvious one, his leadership among the "Heroes," the Crvena Zvezda fans, who, like all other fan clubs, have been and have remained an explosive weapon in the hands of former, present, and future generals, a sort of fifth column in civilian ranks. In this regard, however, it is perhaps not without significance that the first planned and deliberate contacts between Knin and Belgrade were established in 1985, precisely through the mediation of organized concern for Zvezda "fans" in Benkovac and the surrounding area. When everything is taken into account, the equally famous and infamous Zagreb prisoner is a real personification of the diversified affairs and activities of the Dedinje "corporation." The "enterprise" has collapsed, however, along with the country that represented a protected hunting ground for him, as demonstrated by Arkan's own fate.

Legitimacy of Autonomous Region of Krajina
*91BA0230A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 18 Jan 91
pp 16-18*

[Article, including interview with Knin politician Dr. Milan Babic, by Stefan Grujic; place and date of interview not given: "The Question Raised by the Flag in Knin"]

[Text] In a television broadcast while he was still president of the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Central Committee, Bosko Krunic, in response to a question from a television viewer about whether he was afraid of a referendum of the people in Vojvodina about relations with Serbia, did not answer, but instead immediately threw out his "joker": "But then what will we do with the Serbs in Croatia?" The old fox, of course, was not even aware that he was raising a substantive issue. It was a message to Zagreb: "Don't give us that, or you will 'get' the Serbs in Croatia!"

Secondary issues and problems were created for the Serbian people, in the loss of their self-respect, so that the substantive issues would be concealed, in accordance with the formula, "Problems should be created for the Serbs in Serbia itself so that then they will keep quiet outside Serbia." This was clever, wasn't it, to eliminate the self-respect of a people of whom there are more in

Yugoslavia than there are Austrians in Austria, Hungarians in Hungary, Bulgarians in Bulgaria, or, for that matter, Greeks in Greece!

The Serbian people's self-confidence had to return sometime, and it did; and so today the issue of the Serbs in Croatia, quite logically, is the main strategic issue in Yugoslavia and for Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav flag, elsewhere in the background, is fluttering in Knin neither by chance nor for decoration: It is displayed as a question: "Yugoslavia, do you exist, or not? Will you exist, or not?"

Things are slowing coming into place. It would be a mistake to think that the main issue for Yugoslavia is Kosovo and Metohija, or Slovenia. These were masks in fleeing from the essential thing—the Serbs in Croatia. Kosovo and Metohija never became part of Yugoslavia so that it would ever be able to leave it; it was and will remain in Serbia. Slovenia, if it did leave, would diminish Yugoslavia and make it stronger, while weakening itself. Knowing all of this, in order to conceal the truth, Croatia pushed the issue of Kosovo (without Metohija), telling a "fairy tale" instead of the real stories: Are the Serbs in Croatia a minority? The matter, in fact, has been quite monstrously presented, because the issue of a "minority" and a "majority" cannot even be raised at all for Kosovo or Metohija, or for Serbia, and then things are much clearer. What is the point in unnecessary complications?

The fog is gradually lifting.

The Croatian leadership has not attacked the Serbs in Croatia to date, not because it is tame, or because it is democratic, or because it is cowardly, as it was criticized a few days ago in Ban Jelacic Square, but because it is aware—and this is nevertheless proof of its political maturity—that it cannot do anything.

It does not have a state!

That, and nothing else, is agony for the leadership.

Croatia did not even introduce "state" borders into Yugoslavia, to then remove them. Those borders have not been recorded or certified in any international land registry. The Koprivnica opstina can also adopt a constitution, but it would remain as far from being a state as it had been.

No one can take away Croatia's national sovereignty, but it has yet to gain state sovereignty.

Now someone could rightly ask what about Serbia?

And someone could rightly reply: Serbia gave Yugoslavia its state sovereignty!

Let us return to the essence: the Serbs in Croatia! And to the Serbian autonomous province of Krajina and its "chancellor," as Dr. Milan Babic is called, not by chance, by the Zagreb press.

The "Knin chancellor" has the first prerequisite for a politician—a natural authority that he carries with him, composed of calmness, a perpetual smile, and constant understatements. Dr. Milan Babic never says everything, and that is the only thing, in a general sense, that makes him different from his Dinarci [people from the Dinaric Alps]. They say that no one has ever seen him lose his nerve. He perceives politics as constant action, without much talk but with many practical moves. He has not made a single speech, but not a day goes by that he does not make at least one move. He appears everywhere suddenly, and leaves the same way; he does both nonchalantly. He scorns panic and inferiority, and that is why the people in Knin adore him; when asked where he gets that sense of security, he answers that he gets it from his people. Everything is in parallel for him; he distinguishes the Croatian authorities and the Croatian people. Whereas he has unreserved respect for the Croatian people, he respects the Croatian authorities as much as they respect the Serbian autonomous province of Krajina. Is there also a parallel government in Croatia, then? According to Dr. Babic, only that is missing. The Croatian people has a right to control its own fate, and so does the Serbian people. The Croatian people has a right to its own statehood, and so does the Serbian people. Why should one people control another, and why should one government control both peoples? And so forth.

Why should one people consent to fewer rights than other national minorities?

In spite of the high tension of the Serbian question in Croatia, and all the Serbian "banditry," the assimilation of the Serbian people in Zagreb, Split, Zadar, Rijeka, etc., is proceeding in parallel. Over 150,000 Serbs have to keep quiet and speak "Croatian," and are not allowed to sign anything in their own script. But in the Soviet Union, for instance, there are peoples that only number 100,000. "But everything is God's legacy, even a people consisting of 100,000," says Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn.

[Grujic] Dr. Babic, let us start with the Serbian Democratic Party [SDS], because everything began with it. What is the SDS to the Serbs in Croatia?

[Babic] The SDS is a historical phenomenon, the first unified Serbian organization in Croatia. The SDS has been politically successful in uniting the Serbian people located within the AVNOJ [Antifascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders of Croatia. To put it simply, the SDS was successful because it was needed to articulate the Serbian national awareness in this area. It would be illogical if, with the appearance of democracy, one people enjoyed that democracy, while another, instead of enjoying it equally, were exposed to majority tyranny. The task of the SDS is to continue to establish overall democratic relations within the Serbian nation, and democratic relations between the Serbian and Croatian peoples. It resembles a national party, although it is not, but it bears the national strength and it liberated the Serbian national spirit that was enslaved.

And it resembles a movement, because it is a mass organization and includes different social strata in the population.

[Grujic] Did the Serbian National Council also arise from the SDS?

[Babic] With the appearance of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] as the political will of the Croatian people, quasi-democratic relations were established in Croatia, in which more democracy was provided for one people, i.e., more rights for Croats than for Serbs. That was particularly shown in the Assembly, which, with such political action by the HDZ, was supported by all the Croatian national parties, and also the so-called left bloc. It was not turned into an Assembly that would balance the political interests of all citizens, but rather one that fixes and forces through the national interests of only one people, the Croatian people. With such political action through the (truly) Croatian Assembly, one people carried out national torture against another, so that the Serbian people had to find new political instruments to protect their equality. That instrument was found in the institution of the Serbian National Council, and before that the Serbian Assembly.

[Grujic] The Assembly in Srb also adopted a declaration?

[Babic] Through a political initiative from the SDS, in order to confirm national equality and sovereignty, and continued participation in the exercise of sovereignty in the Republic of Croatia, a Serbian Assembly was organized in Srb on 25 July 1990. Its declaration on the sovereignty and autonomy of the Croatian people confirms the Serbian people's right to sovereignty. The Assembly also established the Serbian National Council as a form of presidency, or government. The SDS program committee entrusted the Serbian National Council with institutionalizing the Serbian autonomous region.

[Grujic] The Serbian autonomous region is attacked as part of Serbian capriciousness and Serbian "banditry"?

[Babic] One must keep in mind the basic fact that in the area of part of Dalmatia, Vojna Krajina, and Slavonija, the Serbian people is a historical people, and for centuries that territory has been the ethnic territory of the Serbian people, which is very easy to prove. The very town of Srb, where the Assembly was held, is a toponym that was mentioned back in 850 A.D. (not to mention other evidence of the Serbian presence there, for which we would need a whole issue of NIN). In this area, the Serbian people participated in the creation of all state entities until 1918. Here we have in mind the fact that the Serbs, in the form of the Venetian Dalmatian Krajina, conquered this area as the Morlak army ("Morlaks" was the Venetian name for Serbs). Let us also keep in mind the fact that Serbs, as free soldiers, were border soldiers, and through the institution of the Vojna Krajina, also created the area during the formation of the Hapsburg monarchy, as well as the area for Hungary and

the Croatian Banate. Let us also keep in mind the fact that the Vojna Krajina existed for over 300 years.

The Serbs were also established in that area as a political people, and even formed their own political parties before the Croats. One also should not forget the fact that Serbs enjoyed all national rights and all freedoms throughout the entire Hapsburg monarchy. And the Serbs, as a people from the area of today's republics of Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia, together with Croats and Slovenes, through the short-lived and, to tell the truth, internationally unrecognized state of the Slovenes, Croats, and Serbs, in 1918 joined with the Kingdom of Serbia and Montenegro, and with the rest of the Serbian people in a state of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes—the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

Accordingly, the Serbian autonomous region of Krajina is not the fruit of anyone's caprice of any kind, and least of all "banditry." We could instead speak of a logical continuity. Finally, the AVNOJ borders, which are within that unified state that was created later, are not ethnic borders, and especially cannot be borders between parts of the Serbian people within that unified state. Serbs can by no means exist, in the national sense, as unequal, nor can they become a national minority, nor can they lose their right to a Serbian national area. That is why the task of the Serbian National Council was to be the means by which Serbs would secure their equality, and whose actions would define the Serbian ethnic area—up to the Serbian autonomous province of Krajina.

[Grujic] Consequently, it is not a matter of anyone's good will that it was written in the "old" Croatian Constitution that Croatia was a state of the Croatian and Serbian peoples?

[Babic] Clearly. This has to do with a historical continuity, and that relationship of the Croatian and Serbian peoples cannot be changed by anyone's unilateral political will and the single-nationality institutions of the Croatian people, whether we are talking about a united Yugoslavia or a different one. In short, the Serbian people in Croatia does not have any less right to statehood than the Croatian people, nor will it. The Serbian people as a whole does not have any reason at all to separate itself from the rest of the Serbian people with which it created a joint state. We, however, do not have anything against the Croats' conducting their own national activity, and so we do not even have anything against their independence—as long as it is in the Croatian ethnic area.

[Grujic] What does the SFRY Presidency's initiative, i.e., the order, mean for the Serbs in Croatia, and for the Serbian autonomous province of Krajina?

[Babic] The Serbian people in Krajina is, above all, committed to a strong Yugoslav community (a federation), because it does not have any interest in separating itself from the other parts of the Serbian people. Because of its intermingling with Croats, Moslems, and others,

however, it wants to remain with them in a unified state, and that is why we are committed to defend the Yugoslav federation, even if it has not made a community of all peoples. In accordance with this, I think that the best solution is for both the Republic of Croatia and the Serbian autonomous region to remain within the framework of a federal Yugoslavia.

Nevertheless, since Yugoslavia is composed of associated peoples, respecting the principle of peoples (I say peoples, and not national minorities), according to which they have the right of self-determination to the point of self-secession, we do not have a right to disagree with the Croatian people's right to create a sovereign and independent Croatian state. Likewise, the Croatian people does not have a right to challenge the Serbian people's right to live in a unified state, or the right of the Serbian autonomous region of Krajina to remain in Yugoslavia, or a state that will be formed by that Serbian people.

[Grujic] People in Zagreb are constantly citing the Constitution, that new Constitution of theirs, in which, naturally, there is no place for Serbs, and much less for the Serbian autonomous region of Krajina.

[Babic] The Constitution, the Constitution, the Constitution...That Constitution was adopted contrary to the valid SFRY Constitution that still exists. How can one pass a law contrary to the law? Then it is illegal. How can one adopt a Constitution contrary to the Constitution? Then it is unconstitutional. It is up to Yugoslavia to solve that problem, however, because its Constitution has not been respected. In what respect is the Statute of the Serbian autonomous region of Krajina less constitutional than the Croatian Constitution with respect to the federal Constitution? Finally, we do not have anything against that Croatian Constitution function in the Croatian part of the Republic of Croatia.

[Grujic] Can negotiations take place with representatives of the Republic of Croatia?

[Babic] We want to talk with legitimate representatives of the Croatian people, but they must likewise respect the legitimate representatives of the Serbian people. The Croatian leadership has tried to reduce the relationship of Croats and Serbs in Croatia to a relationship between the Croatian Ministry of Internal Affairs and the "disobedient opstinas" in which the "Serbian populace" is in the majority. We have not consented to that, nor will we.

[Grujic] What do you expect from the talks that were initiated by the Presidency of the federal government?

[Babic] I expect an agreement to be reached on a democratic approach to resolving the Yugoslav political crisis and defining new relations among the Yugoslav peoples, and thus, direct statements by the peoples (and not national minorities by any means) who created Yugoslavia about their future mutual relations within a unified Yugoslavia, some different Yugoslavia, or possibly a newly created state.

POLITICAL

JPRS-EER-91-024
26 February 1991

[Grujic] Who should establish those relations: the present administrative territorial units, or peoples? To whom does sovereignty belong?

[Babic] Sovereignty clearly belongs exclusively to peoples, and those new relations can be created by the express will of peoples, and not administrative units that were not established democratically, but rather by the will of one communist leader.

[Grujic] Did you immediately support the decisions of the SFRY Presidency?

[Babic] I supported them, because I am convinced that that state still exists, and that state, through the Presidency, is expressing its will, and the Presidency, through the army, which is a state power, is expressing its will, and no one has the right to interfere with the functioning of a state. That means that the illegal paramilitary organizations of the Croatian constabulary have to be disbanded and disarmed, because they are the main obstacle to resolving the Yugoslav crisis.

[Grujic] And these days some Serbs have been arrested, but no Croats have been arrested. Who is engaging in "banditry" in Croatia?

[Babic] Banditry is not the right concept for the repression that the Croatian leadership of the Ustasalike constabulary has been conducting against the Serbs in the areas that they have access to, or, to put it simply, the newly established quasi-democratic regime in Croatia is banditry for Yugoslavia and especially for the Serbs in Croatia.

[Grujic] Is the country's Presidency capable of carrying out its decision?

[Babic] It is, of course! I think that the federal government is drawing its strength from the demand of most of the peoples of Yugoslavia for peaceful, stable national relations, and against division, hatred, and fratricide.

[Grujic] Do you believe that in those talks in the Presidency, and in the talks among the republics, the Serbs in Croatia will really be taken into account?

[Babic] Since authentic representatives of Serbia and the Serbian people as a whole are participating in those talks—I am just recalling the Serbian Constitution—there is no danger that any Serbian representative in those talks, and particularly Slobodan Milosevic, would do any harm to the Serbian people as a whole. After all, the Krajina itself would not allow any agreement that would harm it; and Slobodan Milosevic is the president of all Serbs, and not just Serbia, and enjoys the support of all Serbs.

[Grujic] Can the Krajina survive economically, in view of the economic blockade?

[Babic] The Krajina does not have any intention of functioning as an independent state. The Krajina will remain part of the Yugoslav state, and will continue to nurture and develop economic ties with everyone, and especially with Serbia.

[Grujic] Is there a news blockade, and isolation?

[Babic] That blockade does not exist. We receive all news coming from Yugoslavia, and we are overcoming the exclusivism and torture of Croatian radio/television by the establishment of Serbian radio/television. That is the only way for us to resist contemporary attempts at assimilation, by becoming aware of ourselves. A Serbian radio/television transmitter will soon appear on Dinara.

[Grujic] Do you believe in the survival of Yugoslavia?

[Babic] I believe in the future of the Serbian people.

BULGARIA

Finance Minister Kostov on Price Policy

9IBA0232A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Jan 91
pp 1-2

[Interview with Finance Minister Kostov by Katya Karagyaurova; place and date not given: "Minister Kostov Would Like the People To Understand That, the More Price Increases Are Postponed, the Higher They Will Become"]

[Text] [Karagyaurova] In what condition was the Ministry of Finance when you became a member of the Cabinet on 19 December? Did anything surprise you?

[Kostov] My assumptions concerning the country's financial situation proved accurate. The only thing about which I was not certain was the amount by which the actual deficit will exceed the approved deficit because of the fact that Mr. Lukanov's program was not started. I found the Ministry of Finance in functioning condition, which surprised me pleasantly.

From the very first days, I saw that there were many people who were willing to work, as can be seen by the ministry's "output" so far: the directive on bids, our participation in the resolution on applying the amendments to Ukase 56, the drafting of a plan-schedule for work on the budget, work on accounts in all areas, and the agreement with the trade unions and employers on social peace. The way things are going, we shall remain on schedule.

[Karagyaurova] The most pressing problem today is that of price changes.

[Kostov] Our view is dictated by the need for the budget and, to a large extent, the banks and the population, to stop paying such huge subsidies for a variety of goods, subsidies that are growing very rapidly. We simply have no way to procure funds for such purposes.

The price liberalization is not being made to benefit the budget. It is necessary to give enterprises the possibility of coping with the higher interest rate, their own production difficulties, and their increased production costs. That is why we are trying to keep the budget out of the redistribution but in such a way as not to affect deeply the interests of the people.

A substantial number of prices so far held down can no longer be controlled by the state. At the same time, however, we must increase the interest rate and float securities—bonds, treasury notes—and undertake the process of privatization of capital assets and real estate and, depending on the way these matters interact, let prices reach a specific level.

If everything goes well, prices should not increase without restraint until they reach a certain level. The longer we postpone price increases, the higher they will

be. The reason is that our economy is becoming increasingly weak compared to the other economies, that the country must pay for most of its imports in convertible currency, and that it is experiencing an external "price shock." The people must understand that, with every passing day, the situation is becoming increasingly difficult. I believe that, in accordance with production costs and other prices, the price of milk, for instance, will triple or quadruple. Unless the price reform is initiated this month, in February milk will cost 500-to-600-percent more at free market prices.

[Karagyaurova] Can this process be controlled?

[Kostov] Yes, provided that we drop a few anti-inflation anchors, such as stopping the growth of income, establishing a market interest rate and adopting a firm exchange rate for the leva, rapidly expanding the market by creating capital, leasing, and creating a labor market and a market for securities and land. All of this requires time and work on the part of the government and the Grand National Assembly and an agreement with the International Monetary Fund.

[Karagyaurova] What specific program will be implemented by the government?

[Kostov] The government will defend the country's interests as it formulates a program coordinated with the recommendations of the IMF.

[Karagyaurova] In all cases we must take the IMF into consideration. Why?

[Kostov] It is impossible not to take its recommendations into consideration. The IMF could wait a long time, whereas we cannot. A program coordinated with it will enable us to untangle the knot of problems. In practice, the funds supplied to us by the IMF as aid are not all that substantial. What is important is its blessings in solving the problems of our foreign debt, supporting the internal convertibility of the leva, and opening the channels of foreign credits for our trade.

[Karagyaurova] Will the leva become internally convertible?

[Kostov] I doubt that it will be internally convertible, like the Polish zloty, because the Polish population has significant convertible assets in the form of bank deposits in dollars, marks, and so forth. It also has substantial income in foreign exchange earned by Poles abroad and sent to their relatives. Poland enjoyed a number of favorable conditions that enabled it at the start of last year to start making its currency convertible. Thus, the zloty was able to maintain a firm exchange rate throughout the year. This is an exceptional success scored by the Leszek Balcerowicz Program. Unfortunately, there are no such huge foreign exchange offers in our country, as was the case in Poland.

[Karagyaurova] Actually, are there not two separate monetary units in our country?

[Kostov] Yes. There is a process of dollar conversion. We should be able to make the leva domestically convertible for our enterprises and companies. They should have access to convertible currency based on an interbank rate of exchange, accepted by everyone. However, to provide this opportunity to producers is one thing, and to the population another. We shall try to apply the Hungarian system: enable the population to purchase foreign exchange only for travel purposes and with a set annual ceiling.

The dollarization of the economy will have to be officially accepted. Should this take place and should it assume a definite shape, we shall be able to follow the stipulations of the IMF and engage in preliminary preparations for establishing an overall rate of exchange. This has positive and negative aspects. Dollarization is a negative one, but the fact that it will lead to a realistic rate of exchange will be good.

[Karagyaurova] Will there be a wage freeze?

[Kostov] We should try to have one. The price reform will be followed by substantial wage compensations. All wages will rise, and the amount of the supplement will be relatively quite high compared to the minimal, and relatively very low compared to the maximal. Therefore, the correlation between maximal and minimal wages will be, according to our estimates, something in the vicinity of 2.85—that is, we shall achieve something like an "even start." In other words, almost everyone will be stuck in his place, while prices will rise sharply.

After that, however, it would be proper to set a period of time during which wages will not increase. If demands for price rises and so on begin immediately—literally on the following day—this will mean that the reform had been unsuccessful and that we have entered a price and income spiral that could last indefinitely.

[Karagyaurova] Would the government be able to stick to it?

[Kostov] What is important is for the population to understand and accept the change. In that case, the reform could succeed and the government could remain in charge.

[Karagyaurova] Privatization is approaching. Could the budget do something about it?

[Kostov] In my view, privatization is a problem in the sense that the budget should not remove from the credit area all credit resources. On the contrary, despite its difficult situation, it should provide credit resources to the banks so that they could credit the privatization process. This is a very tough requirement, but privatization will take place essentially on the basis of money loans.

The population's privately owned money should be kept in the form of bonds, treasury bills, or certificates of deposit paying a higher interest rate. The first problem can be resolved as follows: All funds obtained from the

process of privatization from the sale of capital assets and real estate and, I hope, also funds from the sale of the property of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and other organizations should be returned to the banks and allow the state to repay, with them, some of its internal debt. The moment the state begins to repay such internal debt from the sale of fixed assets and real estate and, subsequently, of small and medium-sized enterprises, these funds will create a credit resource for the banks. They will not be part of the budget expenditures but will be used to pay the debt. In this manner, the banks will be able to return the funds to those who would like to privatize and pay them back to the state once again, while the state will once again return the funds to the banks. This process among the banks, the state, and the population could operate independently.

The second aspect related to the partial preservation of the purchasing power of the currency will be the floating of securities by the state. For example, a bond loan will pay the high interest, realistically, of 43 percent. We are about to float treasury notes, which are a short-term borrowing by the state for a period of three or six months to be sold at a discount of their nominal value. These are the modest possibilities of the budget in preserving some of the purchasing power of the currency, thus enabling the population to participate in privatization.

[Karagyaurova] Will the housing deposits of the people be protected?

[Kostov] Yes. They will be protected with the new and much higher interest rate, which will be higher than the present rate by a factor of six. This will guarantee the population's deposits against the fast depreciation to which they are now subjected. Naturally, this will not be the full amount but a compromise. It is possible that the compensation for deposits will increase in the future.

[Karagyaurova] What is the current situation of the government?

[Kostov] On the basis of what I hear in interviews on the radio and television, it appears that doubts have arisen concerning the intentions of the economic team's program for action and its ability to defend the interests of the country in the talks with the IMF, as well as doubts concerning its competence. Once again the desire appears to control the actions of the government, as was the case during the one-party cabinet headed by Lukanov. Petur Dertliev wants a multiparty cabinet, which would be the result of the accord reached by a number of political forces. In practical terms, this is an effort to put it in the position of the previous government—that is, a government whose functioning possibilities were very limited.

If no reform is to take place, people like me are not needed because routine work can be done by anyone. I realize that anyone who undertakes a decisive change under conditions influenced by the mistrust of a people

who have not definitively chosen the path of free elections is risking his future as a politician and even as a citizen.

To question the mandate of trust given to us by the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] before we have begun to act with the proviso that we are people who have been asked to do very dirty work and then disappear means that we are being condemned in advance, without giving us any chance to succeed. I see at least a small possibility for success by the team if the situation develops according to the favorable predictions. Like the Poles and despite great sacrifices and suffering, the people will accept the change.

Financial Problems at Belene Nuclear Power Plant

91WP0060Z Sofia OTECHESTVEN VESTNIK
in Bulgarian 9 Jan 91 pp 1-2

[Unattributed article: "The Hull of the Belene Reactor Is Rotting Not Far From Bratislava"]

[Text] Drops of water eventually make a pond, and one leva after another becomes a fat account in a Czechoslovak bank. How to correct the situation?

Several years ago, senior state officials of the Bulgarian and Czechoslovak Governments signed a contract according to which Czechoslovakia was to build the hull of the first reactor of the Belene AETs [Nuclear Power Plant]. The hull is ready and, for more than 12 months, has been sitting at the Bratislava Port. How long will it stay there, does anyone need it, and how much is this waiting costing us?

It is as though the fate of this equipment seems to be the least of the concerns of the responsible individuals in various departments. For example, the moment it became clear that I was interested in the hull, personnel of the Committee on Power Industry immediately assumed a cool attitude. It was as though I was asking them to drink castor oil. I was shunted from one official to another, until I ended up with Engineer Nikita Nabatov, general director of the Nuclear Power Industry Investment Enterprise in Belene. He assumed the role of Hercule Poirot, making sure that I was indeed calling from Sofia because he had been frequently provoked by opponents of the nuclear electric power plants in Svishtov and Belene. The so-called compromise protocol was adopted on 26 February 1990. It defined the way the building of Belene was to take place until the problem could be finally resolved by the Grand National Assembly. In other words, the burden of responsibility was shifted from one shoulder to another. Part of the construction (buildings for cultural and consumer requirements) was continued. However, the basic sub-projects were frozen. The protocol recommends that the hull of the reactor should not be transported. It, too, should wait for the "sentence" to be passed by the people's representatives. Its exact price is 24,028,409.27 leva. No one would be crazy enough to provide us

warehousing facilities and guards out of friendship. Between April and October of last year, we paid 144,257 rubles for insurance, warehousing, security guards, and so forth. Again, last year, in November, we paid another 30,453 rubles, which included a press conference, one such being held once every six months. So far, the additional funds spent on the reactor's hull have totaled 174,710 rubles.

Here is a small detail: I learned from Georgi Shumanov, head of the Power Industry Administration of the Tekhnoimporteksport Commercial Enterprise, that they still had not received their bills for November and December 1990. This means that the amount we mentioned will be higher. Another important and rather alarming detail is the following: Starting in January 1991, payments will be made in convertible currency. So far, the rate of exchange to the dollar has not been established. One thing, however, is quite sure: Those green bank notes will be piling up in the respective Czechoslovak bank, while we keep wondering what to do about the Belene AETs. Meanwhile, Czechoslovakia is justifiably pressing us to move out this 323-ton piece of equipment that occupies a substantial area in the port of Bratislava and is hindering its operations. They will have to wait, however, because, the way things are going, this matter will not be resolved very soon. Our deputies are up to their necks in important problems, and it would not surprise me if "domestic problems," left over from their predecessors, will be taken up by the new deputies, who will possibly enter parliament in May. Meanwhile, the Belene AETs has been the target of a serious "study." Several expert reviews have been made. The conclusion of the specialists (foreigners who are both able and willing) is that the construction of the power plant should be continued, naturally in accordance with some instructions. On 14 January, a new expert evaluation was started by MAGATE, based on the VVER-1000 Project. Here is yet another bit of information to consider: So far, about 1 billion leva have already been spent on this nuclear power plant—that is, 40 percent of the cost of the first reactor. The way things are going, our national debt (if such money is not put to use) will increase. Can we correct this situation? We can. According to the specialists, if the state is unable to allocate the necessary funds to finance the Belene AETs, foreign capital should be invested, the more so because interest in this project is shown by companies in Czechoslovakia, by Siemens, and by others.

Problems of Telephone System Analyzed

91BA0233A Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 14 Jan 91 p 4

[Article by Anna Gotseva, former director of the Communications Scientific Research Institute: "Telephone Communications—A String of Errors, Unused Possibilities, and Questions Without Answers"]

[Text] The link between the economic growth of a country and the condition of its communications infrastructure is unquestionable. Having quickly realized this,

the economically strong countries made huge investments in the development of technologies, systems, and circuits, which made the moving of large volumes of information possible and provide a wide range of communications and other services. With a telephone line, a personal computer acquires access to other computers and data bases, video and radio programs can be transmitted, the daily newspaper can be read on the television screen, and household utensils can be controlled from a distance. The material facilities for providing such a range of tempting services is the contemporary digital telephone system. The latest studies have indicated that providing telephone services will be the main motive force in the development of communications networks for many years into the future.

In the light of global achievements, the condition of our communications infrastructure does not meet even the most modest requirements.

Another 2 million telephones must be installed if we are to satisfy the legitimate need of one telephone line per family. The situation in the big cities is the worst. Here, some 600,000 unsatisfied requests for telephones remain to be met. Quality is far below the required standard. No more than 21 percent of long-distance and 27 percent of local calls result in a conversation, as compared to Sweden, where the respective figures are 77 and 78 percent. Requests for repairs average over four per subscriber annually. The same indicator is 0.7 for Japan, 0.28 for England, and 0.18 for Sweden. The installation of extremely old equipment is continuing, although it is not adapted to big systems and is very difficult to run and maintain. Disproportion in the development of urban and interurban communications is increasing. The automation of long-distance telephone communications, which is defined in terms of meeting the need for long-distance traffic, is 45-50 percent. The international direct dialing telephone exchange is unable to process and handle the increased traffic since 10 November 1989. No more than 9 percent of international calls result in conversations.

The history of our telephone communications abounds with wrong decisions. Procuring the ESK Crosspoint System for interurban telephone communications, which took place at the start of the 1970's, proved to be an error. Our communications industry was unable to master the production of urban and interurban exchanges of this type. The international telephone exchange of the Thompson CSF Company was installed seven years after the delivery contract was signed. Over a long period of time, this deprived the country of income in convertible currency.

A study of the condition and the errors was also made by two foreign teams. The one headed by Mr. Ran concluded that the condition of our communications infrastructure was below any criticism and that we were more than 50 years behind. The team of the European Community highly rated the plans for the development of the

grids, drafted by our specialists, but indicated a number of wrong decisions concerning priority areas in investments.

The conclusions of the two expert groups coincide with the work done by our specialists. Furthermore, up-to-date methods were used in making a complete study of the situation, accompanied by specific suggestions on modernizing fixed assets with contemporary equipment, made as early as 1982. Such developments were converted into a plan for the development of communications through 1990. The plan was backed by a corresponding resolution of the Council of Ministers, which made available the necessary funds for the development of an interurban telephone system and, partially, the Sofia one. That was the first time the state gave some priority to telephone communications, acknowledging the need to replace the obsolete technical base.

In subsequent years, active efforts were made to procure contemporary communications equipment. Offers were studied, and a number of meetings with equipment manufacturers were held. Analyses, evaluations, and ratings of offers and systems were made. Draft resolutions were formulated and submitted to the leadership of the Ministry of Communications and to its various successors.

It was at this point that a total break occurred between the scientific, carefully considered, and extensively discussed proposals of specialists and the subsequent decisions. After the Ministry of Communications was abolished, the managers of the communications administration abandoned the implementation of the Council of Ministers Resolution on the Development of the Country's Interurban System. The Economic Council of the Council of Ministers resolved that convertible currency will be used to purchase licenses for the communications industry. We know the results. There are neither licenses nor contemporary telephone exchanges at a time when millions of foreign exchange leva are being spent on economically ineffective projects. What are left are plans and concepts, which are now being highly rated by foreign experts.

Fairness demands the recognition of an objective reason. The embargo imposed by COCOM on supplying modern communications technologies to East European countries as of 15 September 1988 may have led to making inadequate decisions if there were no possibilities of achieving the desired results and activating the interurban system a few months after September 1988. All preliminary operations related to this system and not covered by the embargo could have been accomplished before that date, as was done by Hungary and the USSR.

The 1980's could have become the happiest period of telephone communications in our country. This was also the most favorable time for turning the system from backward into modern and for decisively narrowing the wide gap between our communications infrastructure and that of the developed countries. Unfortunately, this

opportunity remained unused. Instead of a modern interurban telephone network, the capacity of the seven transit exchanges of the ESK Crosspoint System was increased. The convertible currency spent for such an expansion would have sufficed to procure three digital exchanges with triple the number of switchboards.

The listing of the errors may be continued, but this would not change the situation or recover the lost time. Those who wish to do so could look also at the materials of the repeated investigations made by the Committee for State and People's Control or ignore them, the way they were ignored by the management of the Committee for State and People's Control. Something else is more important: We must study the errors and determine who was responsible for them and then decide where to go from there. What methods and funds and, what is most important, what technologies should be used? Do we have to be the slaves of political decisions or seek the best from the technical viewpoint? The questions are numerous, the time is short, and our telephone infrastructure has reached the limit of its possibilities.

Government Monthly on Technological Renovation

91BA0224A Sofia IKONOMIKA in Bulgarian
Nov 90 p 32

[Article by Stanka Dineva: "Technological Renovation"]

[Text] Technological renovation has become an extremely familiar refrain that, however, did not acquire the expected content. The state planned economy left us a few volumes dealing with the problem, and an economy that, as unanimously assessed by the specialists, largely consists mainly of morally and physically obsolete equipment and technologies.

For a number of years, scientific institutes and laboratories were being created, merged, and separated; justification had been found for investing substantial funds of "people's money" in research and development; foreign currency was being spent to purchase technological systems; plants capable of producing spaceships that, metaphorically speaking, were engaged in the production of bolts and nuts were being built. However, the time of questions has arrived. How was the labor of the hundreds of scientific workers, designers, and testers materialized? What was the result of the millions spent on purchasing "technical miracles"? Why is it that our plants are equipped with machinery that is viewed as a museum exhibit in the economically developed countries? Let us look at the facts.

In recent years, our country appropriated substantial funds for technical updating: 2.3 percent of the national income in 1980; 3.1 percent in 1985; and 3.5 percent in 1988. The drop in the growth rates of funds for technological renovation is obvious. Also obvious today is the result of this process. Whereas in a five-year period (1980-85) such appropriated funds increased by nearly 1

percent, in the three following years (1985-88) they increased by no more than 0.4 percent.

It would be interesting to determine for what purpose and in which way the money was spent. In the period under consideration, we can note a lasting trend toward an expansion of research and technology organizations (we should also take into consideration the way they were influenced by structural changes). There were 368 in 1980, 465 in 1985, and 598 in 1988. The number of scientific workers was, respectively, 22,601 in 1980, 26,891 in 1985, and 30,200 in 1988. In recent years, our people have looked with suspicion at the relatively large number of individuals with higher educations. This was not without a reason. Indeed, compared with other countries that have long outstripped Bulgaria in technological renovation—Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Italy, Spain, South Korea—the number of such workers in our country is, to say the least, impressive. The next question naturally arises: What did they "produce"? If we look at the statistical yearbook of the Central Statistical Administration, we see that the number of topics and assignments related to scientific and technical progress grew steadily—from 18,750 in 1983 to 19,675 in 1985 and 25,260 in 1988.

Actually, the optimism based on the "positive" results, which were increasing with every passing year, stops there. That is the first paradox. The number of topics and assignments worked upon has been steadily growing, while the number of scientific and technical achievements applied in industry has painfully "unglued itself" from the level of stagnation: 8,337 in 1983, 8,479 in 1985, and 16,181 in 1988. We now reach the second paradox, which, in my view, is the most indicative in the development of equipment and technological renovation of the Bulgarian economy: additional profits resulting from scientific and technical progress. Their absolute amount was 907,883,000 leva in 1985. Three years later it dropped by nearly one-half, to 559,491,000 leva. The other indicators are no more optimistic. Despite the oaths sworn at plenums and congresses, capital investments for technological renovation also durably retained their relative size: 2,288,870,000 leva in 1980; 2,068,836,000 in 1985; and 2,302,419,000 in 1988.

In the final account, neglecting the achievements of contemporary science and technology and our inability to make use of what our own or foreign specialists were able to create, were particularly clearly expressed in the licensing policy of our state. Judge for yourselves. In 1980 we purchased 19 licenses, 12 of which were applied. However, not a single Bulgarian license was sold! In 1985, 28 were purchased, 35 were applied, and six were sold. In 1988, 46 were purchased, 22 were applied, and nine were sold. The conclusion is obvious—licenses that, even if we were to believe are the latest items on this market, are already considered obsolete after one or two years but are being sluggishly applied. If we look at the figures, we see that seven of the licenses purchased in 1980 were applied as late as 1985—in other

words, at a time when the seller had long forgotten their existence. Sixteen of the licenses purchased in 1988 remain unapplied.

The natural result of such a policy or, to put it more accurately, of the lack of a proper policy, is the total wearing out of the equipment and the use of long obsolete technologies. These are material-intensive, energy-intensive, and labor-intensive machines and technologies that produce noncompetitive goods. It also means purchasing obsolete equipment and technology from the USSR and the other former socialist countries because of our raw material and market ties to them. This means ecologically dirty production facilities instead of low-waste or wasteless technologies.

The Bulgarian economy resembles a house in which every resident purchases furniture regardless of whether it is necessary or whether it harmonizes with the other pieces of furniture. Despite the pledges that technology will be purchased to cover the entire life cycle of the product, we are bargaining on a "piecemeal" basis. There is virtually no sector free of these problems. We have a chemical industry that is poisoning everything

around it, a power industry that reminds us of its existence during the dark and light hours of the day, agriculture that is testing our capacity to withstand nitrate poisons, a transportation system that is straining our nerves and patience daily, and an electronic industry that makes us wonder whether it exists at all. Against the background of the economic dislocation, we have a tremendous number of scientific and technical cadres who are "running on empty," poorly paid and without the moral and material incentive to work. We have specialists who, for years on end, were considered inept and inefficient, who ignored the greenhouse conditions under which they lived and worked and who, the moment it became possible, sought the ways and means of proving themselves abroad. There is a "drain" of our best minds, which threatens to weaken the already brittle Bulgarian scientific and technical potential that is so greatly needed to stabilize the Bulgarian economy.

Conclusions? Even the greatest optimist would not be able to provide a reassuring balance. But, in my view, this is not necessary. If someone wants to come out of the swamp, the best thing would be to take a look at how deeply into it he has sunk.

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